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***DRAFT *** 
 
IN DEFENSE OF BREAKUPS:  
ADMINISTERING A “RADICAL” REMEDY 
 
Cornell Law Review (Forthcoming, 2020) 
Rory Van Loo† 
Calls for breaking up monopolies—especially Amazon, Facebook, and Google—have 
largely focused on proving that past acquisitions of companies like Whole Foods, 
Instagram, and YouTube were anticompetitive. But scholars have paid insufficient 
attention to another major obstacle that also explains why the government in recent 
decades has not broken up a single large company. After establishing that an 
anticompetitive merger or other act has occurred, there is great skepticism of breakups 
as a remedy. Judges, scholars, and regulators see a breakup as extreme, frequently 
comparing the remedy to trying to “unscramble eggs.” They doubt the government’s 
competence in executing such a difficult task, pointing to decision-making flaws dating 
back to the breakups of Standard Oil in 1911 and AT&T in 1984. Even many scholars 
calling for more vigorous antitrust enforcement recommend alternative remedies. This 
Article asserts that the pervasive hesitancy about administering breakups renders 
antitrust impotent in the face of monopolies—too often a statutory right without a 
remedy. More importantly, the Article challenges the perception of breakups as 
unadministrable. The intellectual foundations for the anti-breakup stance are weak, 
relying on outdated, anecdotal evidence. Moreover, antitrust would benefit from a 
methodological shift toward paying greater attention to the breakup insights yielded 
by other disciplines. In particular, business scholars have studied how the world’s 
leading companies regularly break themselves up voluntarily. Additionally, 
administrative law scholarship has observed a broader evolution toward collaborative 
regulation that shows how the much-maligned historical approaches to antitrust 
remedies could be greatly improved by relying more on the business sector in designing 
and implementing breakups. In other words, insights from outside of antitrust address 
many critiques of breakups and show how that remedy is far from radical and messy. 
Antitrust observers should thus abandon the worldview that compares breaking up 
prior companies to unscrambling eggs. Or at a minimum they should recognize that 
scrambled eggs, once cooked, are divided into smaller portions. A greater willingness 
to do the same to monopolies in the post-merger context and beyond would bring 
regulators more in line with the business sector, which sees divestitures as a routine 
part of effective governance. 
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Menesh Patel, Danny Sokol, Ashwin Vasan, David Walker, and Ramsi Woodcock. Brianne Allan, 
Samuel Burgess, Leah Dowd, Derek Farquhar, Brian Flaherty, Shecharya Flatte, Ian Horton, Ryan 
Kramer, Jack Langa, Tyler Stites, and Brittany Swift provided excellent research assistance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the wake of bipartisan momentum to prosecute big tech companies, antitrust 
authorities have acknowledged that breakups are “perfectly on the table.”1 But this 
remedy faces intellectual opposition from a broader range of the ideological spectrum 
than many realize. Academics have driven a renaissance in antitrust scholarship, 
calling for stronger remedies for anticompetitive behavior, with some proposing 
breakups.2 The breakup attention has focused on whether large corporations are 
violating antitrust laws and how a given breakup would alter competition once the 
 
1 Rob Copeland, Breakup of Tech Giants ‘on the Table,’ U.S. Antitrust Chief Says, WALL STREET 
J. (Oct. 22, 2019, 2:00 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/breakup-of-tech-giants-on-the-table-u-s-
antitrustchief-says-11571765689 [https://perma.cc/9R8B-4U38] (quoting Makan Delrahim, head of 
the DOJ antitrust division). 
2 Scholars have for decades called for reforming antitrust, in what can be described as the Post-
Chicago antitrust movement. See HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT 
OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008) (sharing 
scholarship by Jonathan Baker, Eleanor Fox, Herbert Hovenkamp, Marina Lao, John Kirkwood, 
Daniel Rubinfeld, and Steven Salop, among others). Members of that group and the more recent 
“New Brandeisian” antitrust movement have called for expanding breakups. See TIM WU, THE 
CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 132–33 (2018); Lina M. Khan, Note, 
Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710, 800 (2017); Steven C. Salop, Invigorating Vertical 
Merger Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1962, 1982 (2018). 
2020]              I N  D E F E N S E  O F  B R E A K U P S  3 
process is complete.3 Yet to pursue breakups, policymakers must also believe that 
authorities can administer them, and that the remedy is reasonable. Otherwise, courts 
would insist on another solution, such as mandating that tech companies provide 
competitors access to their platforms.4 In the wake of intensifying scholarly scrutiny of 
antitrust, there has been no sustained attention to administering breakups.5 
In the absence of close examination, the dominant view has remained, even among 
influential scholars supportive of more vigorous antitrust enforcement, that breakups 
are “radical”6 and too costly.7 The biggest conceptual barrier is the belief that breakups 
are too difficult for the government to administer.8 As judges, scholars, and regulators 
have repeatedly put it, breaking up a merged company is like trying to “unscramble the 
eggs.”9  
That administrative resistance to breakups is overlooked in conversations about 
reforming antitrust, but it poses an existential problem. In theory, to combat monopoly 
power obtained through an illegal merger, authorities have long preferred breaking up 
the company to the “perilous” alternative—behavioral remedies, which require 
ongoing government oversight of the monopolist.10 Yet if the preferred remedy—
breakups—has become so infeasible that “we may as well forget about attempting to 
 
3 See, e.g., supra note 2. 
4 See infra Part I.B. & IV.B.2. 
5 See infra Part I (summarizing the literature). 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“[W]isdom 
counsels against adopting radical structural relief.”); Todd Spangler, Will the U.S. Break Up Big 
Tech? Don’t Hold Your Breath, VARIETY (June 4, 2019, 1:36 PM), 
https://variety.com/2019/digital/news/us-antitrust-break-up-facebook-google-amazon-apple-
1203232588/ [https://perma.cc/2S6N-7NSS] (quoting Professor Herbert Hovenkamp as saying, 
“Breakup remedies are radical and they frequently have unintended consequences”). 
7 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Progressive Antitrust, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 71, 99 (2018); Fiona Scott 
Morton, Opinion, Why ‘Breaking Up’ Big Tech Probably Won’t Work, WASH. POST (July 16, 2019, 
2:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/16/break-up-facebook-there-are-
smarter-ways-rein-big-tech/ [https://perma.cc/TE4W-N2F6] (“Just ‘break them up’ is an 
oversimplified sound bite, not a real policy that would restore competition in digital markets and 
benefit consumers.”). 
8 See Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 99 (“The main reason antitrust does not go further is concerns 
about administrability.”) For an example of resistance on those grounds, see, e.g., Menesh S. Patel, 
Merger Breakups, WIS. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 42, 50-51) (on file with the Cornell 
Law Review), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3469984 (concluding more ex 
post merger reviews are necessary but cautioning against breakups when entities have integrated 
their assets, because of “the fundamental difficulties of unwinding consummated mergers”). 
9 See, e.g., Consol. Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252, 261 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(quoting Sonesta Int’l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir. 1973)) 
(“[O]nce the tender offer has been consummated it becomes difficult, and sometimes virtually 
impossible, for a court to ‘unscramble the eggs.’”); Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower Grp., 
Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1513, 1517 (S.D. Ind. 1986) (referring to the “virtual impossibility of 
‘unscrambling the scrambled eggs’”); William J. Baer, Reflections on Twenty Years of Merger 
Enforcement Under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 825, 830 (1997) ( “Once a 
merger takes place and the firms’ operations are integrated, it can be very difficult, or impossible, 
to unscramble the eggs and reconstruct a viable, divestable group of assets.”); F. David Osinski, 
Merger Remedies and the Undersupply of Economic Research,  18 ABA ANTITRUST SEC. ECON. 
COMM. NEWSLETTER, no. 2, Fall 2017, at 5, 7 (“[I]n consummated mergers, … a divestiture may 
not restore competition due to the high cost and risk of unscrambling the eggs.”). 
10 Philip J. Weiser, Reexamining the Legacy of Dual Regulation: Reforming Dual Merger Review 
by the DOJ and the FCC, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 167, 176 (2008). 
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disestablish” integrated firms,11 the law may offer no acceptable remedy to address 
illegal monopolies.  
Through an outside-of-antitrust lens, this Article challenges the prevailing 
assumption that breakups are extreme and prohibitively difficult to administer. It 
contributes the first review of the empirical evidence on the administration of breakups, 
showing that the studies largely responsible for the early view of breakup 
administration as “clearly a disaster”12 suffer from flawed methodologies.13 Moreover, 
scholars’ frequent critiques of breakups from decades and sometimes more than a 
century ago, in the case of Standard Oil, have limited relevance.14 Part of the problem 
is that large antitrust breakups have not occurred in decades and were always rare, 
leaving an absence of recent data points.  
Rather than relying on outdated and discredited antitrust research, this Article 
situates breakups within their broader business and administrative contexts. Current 
antitrust debates fail to consider the insights generated by routine private sector 
breakups. One-third of mergers and acquisitions (M&A)—more appropriately termed 
reorganizations—are divestitures.15 These divestitures include some of the largest deals 
of the last decade, including Fox’s sale of its 20th Century Fox production arm for $71 
billion to Disney; eBay’s spinoff of PayPal; and Hewlett-Packard’s decision to split 
itself down the middle to create two of the one hundred largest companies in the United 
States.16 Despite meaningful differences, the prevalence of these deals alone is 
informative because what antitrust observers have come to view as drastic is 
commonplace in the business world.  
Moreover, scholars in other fields—notably strategic management, finance, and 
organizational behavior—have studied voluntary private sector breakups extensively.17 
They have shown how these voluntary divestitures add value and how better process 
design can improve their implementation.18 Of course, it is important to recognize that 
even if antitrust breakups are costly and lower the firm’s value, they may be 
economically beneficial by deterring executives from pursuing anticompetitive deals.19 
But by remaining disconnected from the extensive business scholarship on divestitures, 
 
11 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80 MICH. 
L. REV. 1155, 1163 (1982). 
12 Barbara A. Clark, Merger Investigations at the Federal Trade Commission: An Insider’s View, 
56 ANTITRUST L.J. 765, 774–75 (1988).  
13 See infra Section II.B. 
14 See infra Part II.A. (explaining limitations in leading historical case studies). 
15 Matthias F. Brauer & Margarethe F. Wiersema, Industry Divestiture Waves: How a Firm’s 
Position Influences Investor Returns, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1472, 1472 (2012).  
16 See Anjanette H. Raymond & Abbey Stemler, Trusting Strangers: Dispute Resolution in the 
Crowd, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 357, 379 (2015); Peter Lee, Reconceptualizing the Role 
of Intellectual Property Rights in Shaping Industry Structure, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1283, n.315 
(2019); Shira Ovide et al., Hewlett-Packard Set to Break Up 75-Year-Old Company, WALL STREET 
J. (Oct. 7, 2014), at A1, https://www.wsj.com/articles/hewlett-packard-to-split-into-two-companies-
1412592132; FORTUNE 500, https://fortune.com/fortune500 [https://perma.cc/49KS-PSK3] (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2019). 
17 See Caterina Moschieri & Johanna Mair, Research on Corporate Divestitures: A Synthesis, 14 
J. MGMT. & ORG. 399, 400 (2008) (“[O]nly by integrating literature in finance, strategy and 
organizational behavior can we obtain a comprehensive picture of divesting modes, antecedents, 
mechanisms and outcomes . . . .”). 
18 See infra Section III.A (reviewing the literature). 
19 See infra Part III. (covering deterrence and shareholder harm). 
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the antitrust literature has exaggerated breakups’ costs and governmental 
incompetence.  
Regulatory scholarship can also improve the antitrust conceptualization of 
breakups. Antitrust scholars focus far more on ex post enforcement actions and legal 
cases, whereas scholars in environmental law and other regulatory fields extensively 
analyze the monitoring of firms and design of regulatory processes.20 In particular, the 
literature in those other fields is in dialogue with a prominent strand of research, 
associated with administrative law, arguing for collaborative governance.21  
Approaching breakup administration less as an adversarial law enforcement 
procedure and more as collaborative monitoring could streamline the process—thus 
speaking to one of the biggest critiques of breakups, delay.  Also, collaborative 
governance aims to leverage business sector expertise to compensate for administrative 
agency sophistication shortfalls and information asymmetries. Most concretely, this 
would mean not only leveraging the monopoly’s resources, but also involving 
independent third-party M&A consultants. Understanding the regulatory design 
literature thus encourages a more realistic assessment of how breakups can be 
implemented rather than an outdated sense of how they were handled decades ago.  
The implications of a more informed view of breakup administrability are far-
reaching. A misguided view of breakups may help explain what many observers see as 
decades of weak antitrust enforcement, leading to charges that “the deck is stacked in 
favor of large powerful firms.”22 Executives know that if they succeed in executing an 
anticompetitive merger, as long as they quickly integrate the companies antitrust 
enforcers or courts will fear breaking the company up.23 Ironically, unfounded fears of 
doing harm through breakups have led to either harmful inaction or weaker remedies 
that are more likely to prove wasteful. If widespread unfounded resistance to 
administering breakups has contributed substantially to the presence of monopolies, it 
has imposed considerable costs on society.24  
Once breakups are understood as a normal part of business affairs, and as capable 
of being co-administered with the private sector, courts and enforcers can deploy them 
more readily as an antitrust remedy. That shift solves the antitrust problem of what to 
do after an anticompetitive merger has occurred. But it also informs debates about how 
 
20 This disconnect reflects the institutional design of different agencies. See Rory Van Loo, 
Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 369, 436–40 
(2019).  
21 See, e.g., IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION, TRANSCENDING THE 
DEREGULATION DEBATE 4–7 (1992) (offering a model of responsive regulation); Jody Freeman, 
Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (“I propose a 
normative model of collaborative governance that seeks to respond to complaints about the failings 
of contemporary regulation.”). 
22 Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in a Time of Populism, 61 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 714, 745 (2018). 
23 Infra Part III.C. 
24 This is true whether one believes the goal of antitrust should be to advance consumer welfare 
or something larger, such as reducing inequality. On distribution and antitrust, see Jonathan B. Baker 
& Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality, 104 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 1, 11 
(2015); Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power and Inequality: The Antitrust 
Counterrevolution and Its Discontents, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 235, 236–37 (2017); Rory Van 
Loo, Broadening Consumer Law: Competition, Protection, and Distribution, 95 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 211, 213, 216 (2019). But see Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1171 (2016). 
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to handle monopolies that achieved their dominance in other ways.25 At the very least, 
the intuitive resistance to breakups needs to end. Unless and until greater evidence is 
produced that breakups harm society, judges should be less hesitant to approve 
breakups, enforcers less tentative to pursue them, and policymakers less resistant to 
write laws that deploy them.  
 
I. THE ANTITRUST REMEDY CONUNDRUM  
  
Breakups exist in a state of conceptual tension. They are often described as the 
preferred antitrust remedy, yet persistently avoided in practice. This Part outlines the 
underappreciated hostility to administering breakups.  
 
A.  Breakups as the Favored Remedy 
 
Antitrust remedies can be classified as behavioral or structural. Behavioral, or 
sometimes called conduct, remedies seek to make the monopolist take or stop taking 
some action, such as providing product access to rivals or prohibiting restrictive 
contract clauses.26 In contrast, breakups are a structural remedy in which a company 
typically transfers assets—such as by selling a business unit or intellectual property to 
another company—or splits itself into two or more pieces.27  
The pervasive skepticism about administering breakups is overlooked in part 
because many judges, scholars, and antitrust authorities have asserted a preference for 
structural over behavioral remedies. For long periods in antitrust history courts viewed 
structural remedies as the best way to address anticompetitive mergers. As the Supreme 
Court observed over fifty years ago, “Divestiture has been called the most important 
of antitrust remedies. It is simple, relatively easy to administer, and sure. It should 
always be in the forefront of a court’s mind when [an anticompetitive merger] has been 
found.”28 In the ensuing decades courts left intact that basic idea that divestiture is the 
“most effective[] of antitrust remedies.”29  
Antitrust enforcers are arguably the most important actors in determining 
remedies because of the Court’s observation that “once the Government has 
successfully borne the considerable burden of establishing a violation of law, all doubts 
as to the remedy are to be resolved in its favor.”30 The two primary federal antitrust 
enforcers are the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ). In the context of merger remedies, FTC officials have cited “less oversight by 
the agencies” as a reason for preferring structural remedies.31 In a 2004 guidance 
 
25 Infra Part IV.C. 
26 See John E. Kwoka, Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforcement 
Actions and Merger Outcomes, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 619, 636 (2013). 
27 See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies 
6 (2011). 
28 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 330–31 (1961). 
29 See Steves & Sons v. JELD-WEN, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 3d 614, 648 (E.D. Va. 2018) (quoting E.I. 
du Pont, 366 U.S. at 326); In re Chicago Bridge & Iron Co., Docket No. 9300, 2005 WL 120878, at 
*50 (F.T.C. Jan. 6, 2005). 
30 Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 575 (1972) (quoting E.I. du Pont, 366 U.S. at 
334). 
31 See Osinski, supra note 9, at 7. 
2020]              I N  D E F E N S E  O F  B R E A K U P S  7 
document, the DOJ reiterated its preference for structural remedies “because they are 
relatively clean and certain, and generally avoid costly government entanglement in 
the market.”32  
Those statements have left the impression that enforcers have retained a strong 
preference for structural remedies in merger review. In 2018, a federal judge 
considering a private lawsuit to break up a company that merged six years earlier 
observed that “the DOJ seeks divestiture in the vast majority of cases like this one.”33 
Putting aside for the moment the accuracy of that statement,34 the judge proceeded to 
reiterate the Supreme Court’s characterization of antitrust law as viewing “divestiture 
as the remedy best suited to redress the ills of an anticompetitive merger.”35 
For similar reasons as judges and enforcers, scholars have also often stressed the 
superiority of structural remedies. Structural remedies have the broadest support “in 
merger cases, where divestiture is the natural remedy for breaking apart what never 
should have been joined together in the first place.”36 The literature emphasizes that 
structural remedies are “administratively considerably easier in that, once divestiture 
has occurred, the agency’s job is largely complete.”37  
More recently, Lina Khan argued that structural remedies are superior to 
behavioral remedies in the context of a proposal for platform separation legislation.38 
A separation mandate would, for instance, prevent Amazon from both operating an 
online marketplace and selling its own goods on that platform. Khan points out that 
structural separation regimes have been preferred to behavioral remedies because they 
are “highly administrable” and require less ongoing monitoring.39  
Thus, even as some progressive antitrust scholars have called for a “new 
framework for holding private power to account,” in which “[s]tructural remedies are 
to be preferred,”40 they engage with the issue of administering breakups at most in 
passing. In those brief discussions, they understandably echo in more modern contexts 
many of the same theoretical reasons why courts long claimed to prefer structural 
remedies. In light of the pervasive preferences expressed for structural remedies, it is 
understandable why the deep-seated resistance to administering breakups has remained 
largely unacknowledged and unchallenged.  
 
B.  Hostility to Administering Breakups  
 
 
32 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div., Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies 7 
(2004) [hereinafter 2004 Merger Remedy Policy Guide].  
33 Steves & Sons, 345 F. Supp. 3d at 648 (applying the Clayton Act in a private action).  
34 See infra Part I.B. 
35 Id. (quoting California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 285 (1990)) 
36 Spencer Weber Waller, The Past, Present, and Future of Monopolization Remedies, 76 
ANTITRUST L.J. 11, 15 (2009); see also Steven C. Salop, Modifying Merger Consent Decrees to 
Improve Merger Enforcement Policy, ANTITRUST, Fall 2016, at 15, 18.  
37 Kwoka, supra note 25, at 636. 
38 See Lina M. Khan, The Separation of Platforms and Commerce, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 980 
(2019) 
39 See id. at 985–86, 1063–64, 1074–75.  
40 Tim Wu, The Utah Statement: Reviving Antimonopoly Traditions for the Era of Big Tech, 
MEDIUM: ONEZERO (Nov. 18, 2019), https://onezero.medium.com/the-utah-statement-reviving-
antimonopoly-traditions-for-the-era-of-big-tech-e6be198012d7 [https://perma.cc/JZN5-5J42]. 
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Despite the favored status of structural remedies in theory, antitrust breakups have 
become rare in practice. Part of the issue is that the statements of preference are relative 
rather than absolute. Additionally, concluding that structural remedies are generally 
superior to behavioral remedies does not bind the government in any given case.  
Part of the confusion is that in some antitrust contexts, divestitures are favored. 
Divestitures that occur each year as part of merger approval have often involved the 
sale of a small part of the combined business.41 However, those divestitures have until 
recently tended to be small—such as a handful of gas stations that would have left local 
monopolies post-merger in a specific town.42 Whereas in a 1999 retrospective the 
highest price paid for divested assets as part of merger approval was “more than a 
hundred million dollars,”43 Instagram—if Facebook was forced to divest it—would 
reportedly fetch a price of over a hundred billion dollars.44  
Even if large pre-merger divestitures become common, they form part of a 
reorganization that still makes the divesting company bigger, not—as with breakups in 
other contexts—to make a company smaller. Accordingly, although breakups can be 
of any size and arguably include divestitures ordered during merger review, the term 
will be used herein to refer to a significant breakup of a business outside of the merger 
approval process.  
The government has not broken up one of the country’s largest firms since 1982 
when it split AT&T into seven telephone operating companies and a long-distance 
carrier.45 However, the intellectual case against breakups had been building long 
before. Since at least the mid-twentieth century, courts have been wary of breaking up 
a unitary company. In a landmark 1953 case, United States v. United Shoe,46 the court 
described the government’s request to dissolve a shoe manufacturer into three separate 
companies as “unrealistic.”47 The court pointed out that United Shoe produced all shoes 
“at one plant in Beverly, with one set of jigs and tools, one foundry, one laboratory for 
machinery problems, one managerial staff, and one labor force. It takes no Solomon to 
see that this organism cannot be cut into three equal and viable parts.”48  
Much of the intellectual foundations of the opposition to breakups come from the 
Chicago School. They have theorized that it is quite difficult to know what makes a 
firm appeal to consumers.49 For instance, is Apple popular because of its patents, clever 
marketing, the genius of Steve Jobs, or something else?50 Since courts and regulators 
are unlikely to be able to figure such questions out, a governmental breakup would risk 
 
41 See infra Section II.B (reviewing studies of government divestitures). 
42 See infra Part IV.A. 
43 BUREAU OF COMPETITION, FTC, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION’S DIVESTITURE PROCESS 8, 18–
19 (1999) [hereinafter 1999 DIVESTITURE STUDY] (studying use of divestitures during merger 
review).  
44 Bernard S. Sharfman, The Undesirability of Mandatory Time-Based Sunsets in Dual Class 
Share Structures: A Reply to Bebchuk and Kastiel, 93 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 1, 5 (2019). 
45 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 201, 224 (D.D.C. 1982). 
46 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953). 
47 Id. at 348.  
48 Id. 
49 Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy, 16 J. L. & ECON. 1 
(1973); Sam Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial Concentration, 20 J. L. & ECON. 229 
(1977); RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW (2d ed. 2001).     
50 See Ramsi A. Woodcock, The Antitrust Duty to Charge Low Prices, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1741, 
1745 (2018).   
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ruining what consumers value most about the company. Thus, regardless of how 
monopoly power is obtained, once it exists a breakup risks undermining consumer 
welfare. These scholars have also pointed out that this risk weighs against breaking up 
monopolies who gained and maintained their monopoly power by offering superior 
products rather than through anticompetitive conduct.51 The law does not allow for 
breaking up such companies.52 Stated otherwise, the government wants to avoid 
smashing success. 
Scholars have also long criticized the government’s real-world execution of 
breakups.53 The main evidentiary foundations of those concerns are twofold. First, 
many critiques stress the messiness of prior breakups.54 One cautionary tale is of the 
1970 dissolution of El Paso Natural Gas.55 After antitrust authorities obtained a judicial 
order to break up the company, implementation took seventeen years and three 
Supreme Court orders urging the parties to proceed “without delay.”56 Observers 
believe that these and other incidents raise doubts about competence, as “courts’ 
expertise lies in answering legal questions, not making [day-to-day] business decisions 
about questions such as pricing, product introduction, and investment in risky 
ventures.”57 
A second foundation for skepticism of divestitures’ administrability comes from 
empirical research. Several studies of DOJ and FTC divestitures in the 1960s and 1970s 
found that few divestitures contributed to competition, with the earliest and most 
prominent of these examinations concluding that divestitures “could not be branded 
anything but a failure.”58  
Despite an already emerging intellectual hostility to breakups, the government 
proceeded with breaking up AT&T because it was an unusual case. AT&T was 
“substantially a creature of regulation and public intervention.”59 As a result, even 
those opposed to government intervention in private enterprise could see a breakup of 
the company as consistent with their values. Moreover, the company had about 90 
percent of the market for long-distance calls and owned many local telephone 
 
51 See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 49, at 5. 
52 See infra Part IV.C. (explaining and challenging this stance). 
53 See, e.g., Emanuel Celler, The Trial Court’s Competence to Pass Upon Divestiture Relief, 10 
ANTITRUST BULL. 693, 693 (1965) (describing criticisms of trial judges’ competence to issue 
remedies of divestiture for antitrust violations, including being too busy or inexpert); Jerrold G. Van 
Cise, Limitations Upon Divestiture, 19 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 147, 147–48 (1950) (criticizing the 
DOJ’s pattern of too heavily searching for antitrust violators and too heavily relying on divestiture 
as a remedy). 
54 See infra Section II.A (reviewing scholarly discussions of past breakups). 
55 See Michael C. O’Connor, Divestiture in Light of the El Paso Experience, 48 TEX. L. REV. 792, 
792 (1970). 
56 United States v. El Paso Nat. Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 662 (1964). 
57 See also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES 
AND THEIR APPLICATION 156 (1999). 
58 See Kenneth G. Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement: Pyrrhic Victories?, 12 J.L. & ECON. 43, 47–
53 (1969); Malcolm R. Pfunder et. al, Compliance with Divestiture Orders Under Section 7 of the 
Clayton Act: An Analysis of the Relief Obtained, 17 ANTITRUST BULL. 19, 20–21 (1972). 
59 William E. Kovacic, Designing Antitrust Remedies for Dominant Firm Misconduct, 31 CONN. 
L. REV. 1285, 1303 (1999). 
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monopolies nationwide.60 Thus, if someone wanted to make a phone call to or from 
much of the country, the only option was AT&T.61  
In the face of that government-created monopoly, Stanford Professor William 
Baxter assumed leadership of the DOJ antitrust division and sought a dissolution. At 
the same time, Baxter was a “Chicago school economist”62 who thus preferred minimal 
governmental intervention and an emphasis on efficiency.63 As he orchestrated the 
AT&T breakup, Baxter established the principles that would help ensure another one 
would not happen for decades.64 Baxter declined to pursue breakups in a number of 
other cases—including IBM—and espoused a basic principle that “if ‘there is no 
assurance that appropriate relief could be obtained,’ then the government must question 
the value to consumers of prosecuting the antitrust case at issue.”65 That principle, 
created and embraced by scholars, became akin to a “Hippocratic oath for antitrust 
enforcers and jurists.”66  
That new cautionary approach to remedies, and to antitrust overall, was put to the 
test in the DOJ’s case against Microsoft in the 1990s and early 2000s.67 The company 
supplied the operating system for over 80 percent of computers and allegedly used that 
position to favor its own computer programs.68 For instance, it required PCs to install 
Windows and Internet Explorer.69 In 2000, the government proposed separating the 
company’s operating system from its software applications—thus creating two 
entities.70 The district court agreed to a breakup, mentioning deference to the 
government on the issue of remedies after it had established that Microsoft violated 
antitrust law.71 
The Microsoft district court’s choice of a structural remedy attracted much 
attention among legal scholars. By the time the Court of Appeals considered the case 
in 2001, many scholars had weighed in not only through amicus briefs but through law 
review articles that directly referred to the case.72 Robert Crandall’s 2001 study looked 
at divestiture cases against companies that—like Microsoft—had not obtained their 
monopoly power through mergers.73 It found that only in four or five cases had courts 
ever ordered divestiture. It then examined nine structural relief cases and concluded 
 
60 See Robert W. Crandall, The Failure of Structural Remedies in Sherman Act Monopolization 
Cases, 80 OR. L. REV. 109, 186 (2001). 
61 See id. 
62 Richard A. Epstein, The AT&T Consent Decree: In Praise of Interconnection Only, 61 FED. 
COMM. L.J. 149, 155 (2008).  
63 See Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 665 (1998). 
64 See Howard A. Shelanski & J. Gregory Sidak, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries, 68 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001). 
65 Id. (quoting In re Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp, 687 F.2d 591, 594 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
66 Id. at 2, n.5 (explaining how the new remedy “axiom has long influenced academic writings on 
antitrust and regulatory policy.”). 
67 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64 (D.D.C. 2000), vacated, 253 F.3d 34 
(D.C. Cir. 2001). 
68 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 73–74 (D.C. Cir. 2001).  
69 See id. at 45.  
70 See id. at 48; Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d. at 62. 
71 See Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d at 62. 
72 See, e.g., Amicus Brief (Proposed Conclusions of Law) by Robert H. Bork in Support of 
Microsoft Corp., Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (No. 98-1232), ECF 532; Amicus Brief by 
Lawrence Lessig, Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (No. 98-1232), ECF 533.  
73 See Crandall, supra note 60, at 109. 
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“that with one exception . . . there is very little evidence that such relief is successful 
in increasing competition, raising industry output, or reducing prices to consumers.” 
Moreover, in the lone exception—AT&T—Crandall concluded that behavioral 
remedies could have produced comparable results.74 Crandall deemed structural 
remedies to address monopolies like Microsoft were unusual and very likely to fail.75 
In another 2001 article, Howard Shelanski and Gregory Sidak analyzed the 
Microsoft context more directly, and challenged the common remedy hierarchy in 
antitrust by observing that “ambitious structural remedies that incorporate supervisory 
and behavioral elements might require as much, or even more, continued judicial 
scrutiny as behavioral remedies require.”76 They urged the Microsoft court to tailor the 
remedy to the context,77 which poses a challenge to breakups because behavioral 
remedies can be crafted that relate only to the anticompetitive conduct. In contrast, a 
breakup does not as directly address the anticompetitive action unless that action was 
a merger. Thus, Shelanski and Sidak’s proposal implied that divestitures should only 
be applied to monopolies that had obtained their dominance through prior mergers—
unlike Microsoft. Also, Shelanksi and Sidak argued that the remedy must “advance 
economic welfare at the lowest possible social cost.”78 A cost-benefit calculation was 
unlikely to provide support for divestitures under the prevailing zeitgeist because, as 
Richard Posner stated in a 2001 antitrust textbook, “Structural remedies such as 
divestiture are, as we know, slow, costly, [and] frequently ineffectual . . . .”79 
In accordance with these and other scholarly views, the Court of Appeals 
overturned the remedy chosen.80 The court acknowledged that divestiture “is indeed 
‘the most important of antitrust remedies,’”81 but noted that because Microsoft had not 
obtained its monopoly power through anticompetitive mergers, it was appropriate to 
proceed cautiously before ordering a breakup.82  
Several of the opinion’s other points signaled a broader decline in the stature of 
breakups. The court directly dismissed the idea of deferring to the government after it 
had won its liability case.83 More ominously, it described divestitures as “radical” and 
argued that because Microsoft had not obtained its monopoly power through mergers, 
the “logistical difficulty” of splitting the company may weigh against divestiture.84 
From the resistance to breaking up a single shoe production facility, courts had evolved 
to skepticism about breaking up a company even along two distinct but technologically 
 
74 Id. at 189. 
75 Id. at 197-98. 
76 Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 64, at 54. 
77 Id. at 3 (“[A]ny remedy should address the conduct for which Microsoft was found liable.”).  
78 Id. 
79 RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 268 (2d ed. 2001). 
80 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (revising also the scope of 
the liability). Four eminent economists argued that Microsoft should not be broken up because of 
administrability See Brief of Amici Curiae Robert E. Litan, Roger G. Noll, William D. Nordhaus, 
and Frederic Scherer at 46–49, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(No. 98-1232). 
81 Id. at 105 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 331 (1961)). 
82 See id.  
83 Id. at 80–81. 
84 Id. at 80, 106. 
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linked product lines. Finally, the court seemed to adopt the view of prominent antitrust 
scholars encouraging a close tailoring of the remedy to the anticompetitive behavior.85  
By emphasizing that breakups’ “long-term efficacy is rarely certain,”86 the court 
painted uncertainty as cause for skepticism about breakups. That emphasis underscores 
how the cost-benefit formulation weighs against breakups. It is easier to identify the 
costs than the competitive benefits. There will often be clear increases in ongoing 
operating expenses because, for example, Facebook and Instagram would need to have 
two headquarters rather than one. Additionally, perhaps the most concrete and 
unavoidable category of costs in a breakup relates to the transition. Companies hire 
reorganization specialists, such as attorneys, accountants, and consultants; cover 
moving expenses; and absorb considerable employee time lost to managing and 
implementing the reorganization rather than producing the company’s core product.87 
Courts and enforcers must also devote resources to monitoring and overseeing the 
breakup.88  
In contrast, the main antitrust benefits of a breakup stem from improved 
competition. Yet the difficulty of predicting competitive effects is “axiomatic.”89 
Relatedly, it is challenging to quantify the innovation and economic gains from two 
smaller, more nimble companies.90 Thus, whereas costs of a breakup are undeniable, 
inevitable, and clearly identifiable, the benefits are inherently uncertain. Given that 
uncertainty, the Microsoft court’s urging of “great caution”91 in adopting breakups—if 
taken literally—could alone make divestitures rare or nonexistent by imposing an 
impossible evidentiary burden on the government. Whether due to the court’s 
resistance or political changes, the government subsequently decided not to pursue a 
breakup, instead settling for behavioral remedies.92 
The shift in thinking on remedies in the early 2000s, albeit limited to merger 
remedies, can be seen beyond courts. In its 2004 Policy Guide to Merger Remedies, 
the DOJ announced, “Structural remedies are preferred to conduct remedies in merger 
cases . . . .”93 However, in its 2011 policy guidance, the DOJ provided a more measured 
assessment for remedies in merger cases, declaring, “In certain factual circumstances, 
structural relief may be the best choice to preserve competition.”94 Antitrust enforcers 
went from viewing behavioral remedies as “more difficult to craft, more cumbersome 
and costly to administer, and easier than a structural remedy to circumvent”95 in 2004 
 
85 See id. at 107. 
86 Id. 80, 98–99. 
87 See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. 
L. REV. 937, 953 (1981) (describing “heavy administrative” costs). 
88 See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 64, at 32–34. 
89 John M. Newman, Antitrust in Digital Markets, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1556 (2019). 
90 Infra Part III (discussing possible diseconomies of scale). 
91 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Timothy J. Muris 
& Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, First Principles for Antitrust Review of Long-Consummated Mergers, 
5 CRITERION J. ON INNOVATION 29, 47  (2020) (“[I]f the government seeks to unwind a 
consummated merger, it must prove that the prospective benefits of that structural remedy outweigh 
the prospective harms, including the costs and unintended consequences that often arise from 
corporate de-integration and inevitably increase with time.”) 
92 See id. at 98–103; infra Part IV.B.1. (discussing political factors).  
93 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 32, at 7. 
94 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 27, at 4.  
95 2004 MERGER REMEDY POLICY GUIDE, supra note 32, at 7–8. 
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to seeing them as a “valuable tool” in 2011.96 That shift occurred under the 
administration of President Obama, who had promised to “reinvigorate antitrust 
enforcement” by restructuring merger review.97 
A 2007 case illustrates the government’s ambivalence regarding breakups. Seven 
years had passed since the anticompetitive purchase of a hospital, causing the FTC to 
decide against a divestiture out of concern about the “potentially high costs inherent in 
the separation.”98 In the same opinion, the FTC explained, “Divestiture is the preferred 
remedy for challenges to unlawful mergers, regardless of whether the challenge occurs 
before or after consummation.”99  
Thus, the rhetoric of preferring structural remedies sounds more expansive than it 
is in practice. Once a few years have passed since the merger, or the entities have 
integrated, the government is often reluctant to pursue a divestiture. In recent decades, 
the professed preference for structural remedies should have come with a caveat of 
“unless it would be costly or messy.”100  
In short, deploying breakups as a remedy faces a considerable barrier beyond those 
that have been the focus in the budding literature fueling a revival of antitrust. When 
observers compare breakups to unscrambling eggs, they are usually referring to the 
undoing of a prior consummated merger.101 Scholars and courts are even more resistant 
to splitting up companies in other contexts.102  
This harsh view of breakups has larger implications for antitrust as an institution. 
Behavioral remedies are often costly and messy.103 The theoretical preference for 
structural remedies thus poses a dilemma for antitrust. Enforcers must ask “whether 
any remedy is sufficiently practicable to yield net benefits” to determine whether a case 
should be brought at all.104 In other words, the consensus is that if there is no practicable 
remedy, the government should leave the monopolist alone.  
When the most practical remedy available is seen as a “clear[] disaster”105 and 
“slow, costly, [and] frequently ineffectual,”106 the Hippocratic oath for antitrust would 
direct authorities not to act.107 The primary scholarly critique of antitrust law is the 
failure to act.108 As Chief Justice Marshall observed in Marbury v. Madison, the 
government cannot be called a “government of laws . . . if the laws furnish no remedy 
 
96 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 27, at 6–7.  
97 William E. Kovacic, Rating the Competition Agencies: What Constitutes Good Performance?, 
16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 903, 904 (2009) (quoting Senator Barack Obama, Statement for the 
American Antitrust Institute (Feb. 20, 2008)). 
98 In re Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp., Docket No. 9315, at *6-7 (F.T.C. Jan. 
12, 2006). 
99 Id. at 91. 
100 When consummated mergers are more recent in time, the preference may hold. 
101 See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing the egg metaphor). 
102 See Hovenkamp, supra note 57, at 156. 
103 Infra Part IV.B. 
104 Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 64, at 36 (emphasis omitted). 
105 Clark, supra note 12, at 7754. 
106 POSNER, supra note 79, at 268. 
107 See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 64, at 2 (discussing Hippocratic standard). 
108 See Jonathan B. Baker et al., Unlocking Antitrust Enforcement, 127 YALE L.J. 1916, 1919 
(2018); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. 
L. REV. 257, 268–71 (2001); JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES: A 
RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF U.S. POLICY 158 (2015); Khan & Vaheesan, supra note 24, at 237. 
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for the violation of a vested legal right.”109 The view of breakups as the best remedy 
but unworkable contributes to antitrust law’s difficulty taking action against 
monopolies.110 
 
II. THE WEAK EVIDENCE AGAINST ADMINISTRABILITY  
 
This Part interrogates the common assumption that breakups are too unwieldy by 
exploring its evidentiary foundations. The point is not to debate the competitive impact 
of divestitures. The goal is instead to understand the literature on the administrability 
of the breakup remedy. Even if we assume breakups would increase competition once 
implemented, what is the support for arguments that we cannot trust courts and 
agencies to manage the process effectively?  
 
A.  The Limitation of Case Studies 
 
Narratives hold outsized influence on perceptions and beliefs.111 The narratives 
that loom largest in antitrust remedies are of the major historical breakups, which 
caused many observers to sour on divestiture as a remedy.112 This Section focuses on 
two of them: Standard Oil,113 because as “the mother of all monopolization cases,”114 
it holds sway in scholarly conceptions of divestitures and is still debated;115 and 
AT&T,116 because as the most recent large breakup and “arguably the most significant 
antimonopoly case [in] the U.S.,”117 it presumably demonstrates the most advanced 
administration yet to be applied to a major government dissolution. Each of these 
historical breakups has been mentioned repeatedly in discussions of divestitures, even 
decades after they occurred.118 
The 1911 breakup of Standard Oil remains “iconic because it was the first time 
antitrust was used to break up a company, and at the time Standard Oil was the largest 
company in the United States.”119 In its appeal to the Supreme Court, the company 
argued that its unitary nature made a dissolution logistically impractical and dangerous 
 
109 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
110 See infra Part IV. (discussing breakups among other remedies). 
111 See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 13 (2d ed. 2005) (applying the power 
of narratives to asset bubbles); Jennifer Edson Escalas, Self-Referencing and Persuasion: Narrative 
Transportation Versus Analytical Elaboration, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 421, 427–28 (2007) 
(demonstrating through controlled experiments the influence of narratives in marketing context). 
112 William E. Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the 
Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1105, 1149 (1989) (“Fresh memories 
of the deconcentration experiences of the 1970s have convinced many that the divestiture suit is a 
hopelessly flawed instrument of antitrust policy.”).   
113 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
114 Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 290 (2003). 
115 See Kovacic, supra note 59, at 1300. 
116 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub. nom., Maryland v. United 
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). 
117 Howard Shelanski, Antitrust and Deregulation, 127 YALE L.J. 1922, 1945 (2018). 
118 See, e.g., Peter C. Carstensen, Remedies for Monopolization from Standard Oil to Microsoft 
and Intel: The Changing Nature of Monopoly Law from Elimination of Market Power to Regulation 
of Its Use, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 815 (2012) (mentioning Standard Oil 46 times and AT&T 14 times); 
Kovacic, supra note 112 (mentioning Standard Oil 23 times and AT&T 26 times). 
119 Barak Orbach & D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust Energy, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 429, 432 (2012). 
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to the oil industry and the economy more generally.120  “There are many parts, but each 
part has its place, and if a part is taken out, the whole structure is disintegrated,” the 
company predicted.121 Those warnings, if believed, would be fatal to breakups because 
antitrust seeks to increase the number of competitors and overall industry output.122 
Divested pieces cannot provide those benefits if they cease to operate.  
The company’s defense is noteworthy because critics of breakups have long 
echoed it. Microsoft used similar arguments to overturn the court-ordered dissolution 
in 2001, citing the impracticability of undoing its “unitary” organization.123 The Court 
of Appeals referred to that argument in overturning the breakup order.124 One of today’s 
leading progressive antitrust intellectuals, Fiona Scott Morton, has argued against tech 
breakups based on integration, saying, “By the time any antitrust verdict is rendered, 
there will be one coherent Facebook and no divisions to divest.”125  
Standard Oil was correct that its breakup required “a number of complicated 
restructurings.”126 The court order split the company into “eleven large production and 
distribution companies” and “forced the spin-off of several smaller refining companies, 
pipeline companies, and even a tank car company.”127 Nonetheless, the dissolution of 
Standard Oil proceeded “relatively smoothly even though most of the newly 
independent entities were deprived of the full-scale integration that Standard had 
argued was vital to their survival.”128 Even critics of the breakup agree that the oil 
industry and the divested pieces of Standard Oil thrived in the years after the 
breakup.129 We do not know what would have happened otherwise, but Standard Oil’s 
“warnings of industrial apocalypse”130 turned out to be false. 
To be clear, scholars still debate the efficiency benefits of the dissolution.131 And 
the structure of Standard Oil was not the worst-case-scenario for divestitures. But 
breakup succeeded, despite substantial restructuring challenges, in facilitating “the 
emergence of a number of substantial independent competitors—including Amoco, 
Chevron, Exxon, and Mobil—where there had been but a single firm before.”132 
Scholars have a more favorable impression of the competitive impact of the 
AT&T divestiture than that of Standard Oil, most thinking that it was overall 
beneficial.133 However, its administration came under withering scholarly attack soon 
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122 See Jon M. Newman, Procompetitive Justifications in Antitrust Law, 94 IND. L.J. 501 (2019) 
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130 Kovacic, supra note 59, at 1298. 
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133 See Crandall, supra note 60, at 123–92; Kovacic, supra note 59, at 1303. 
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after completion. The main critique was the degree of court involvement.134 It took ten 
years to even get from the government’s original filing of the lawsuit to the divestiture 
order, “spanning four Congresses, three Presidents, and two U.S. district court 
judges.”135 That order then began a period of extensive court monitoring and follow-
up legal battles. About “thirty-five to forty separate waiver requests were filed per year 
in the first eight years of the decree,” often taking years to resolve.136 Some scholars 
have described the AT&T divestiture as a “failure” either because of the extensive costs 
and delays of relying on the court, or due to flawed decision-making by government 
officials who were tasked with running a business.137 Like with Standard Oil, it is also 
impossible to know what would have happened had the government not broken up 
AT&T.138 
As some perspective on these critiques, AT&T involved perhaps the largest set of 
divestitures in history.139  It thus provides an extreme example of a large-scale and 
diffuse breakup. Moreover, as the discussion above illustrates, much of the 
administrability concerns center on the court’s involvement. Thus, to the extent that 
the case furnishes arguments against breakups, it is against a breakup heavily managed 
by the courts.  
This discussion is not meant to suggest that the Standard Oil, AT&T, or other 
historical dissolutions were perfect. As with most any large-scale project from long 
ago, whether in the private or public sector, hindsight enables observers to identify 
improvements. However, it would be perplexing if these cases continue to shape 
perceptions of divestitures. They are decades, and in the case of Standard Oil, over a 
century old. Similarly, to cite the United Shoe impracticability of splitting up a single 
shoe foundry as evidence of breakup ineptitude lacks analytic rigor and is anachronistic 
because even today’s large shoe companies no longer produce their shoes out of a 
single factory.140  
It should also give critics pause that decades after the breakup of AT&T, which 
by all accounts was followed by innovation, lower prices, and considerable 
competition, leading antitrust and telecommunications scholars cannot agree on 
whether the breakup represented “a policy success or a policy failure.”141 At a 
minimum, the subsequent world leadership of U.S. telecommunications companies and 
prosperity of oil companies indicates that even lengthy and messy breakups can still be 
followed by trailblazing innovation and intense competition.142 Especially without 
 
134 See, e.g., Paul W. MacAvoy & Kenneth Robinson, Losing by Judicial Policymaking: The First 
Year of the AT&T Divestiture, 2 YALE J. REG. 225, 261 (1985). 
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136 Crandall, supra note 60, at 115. 
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140 See Amit Singh, Nike Manufacturing and Supply Chain Strategies, MARKET REALIST (Oct. 17, 
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considering how better design could address any flaws in past breakup administration, 
the historical record of prominent divestitures should not be cited as reason to condemn 
large-scale breakups today.  
 
B.  The Lack of Systemic Evidence  
 
Beyond case studies, several more quantitative examinations in the 1960s through 
the 1980s influenced observers to see divestitures as “notoriously ineffectual.”143 The 
most recent and comprehensive study during that time period, by Robert Rogowsky, 
came to similar conclusions as the previous one that had painted a “bleak” picture of 
antitrust remedies.144 Rogowsky analyzed over one hundred government antitrust 
cases.145 Like the other early influential empirical studies, Rogowsky’s did not analyze 
market data or consumer welfare. Instead, he identified success as a divestiture that 
“reestablishes the acquired firm (1) independent of the parent, (2) viable in the long 
run, and (3) adequately structured to be an effective competitor.”146 Based on these 
characteristics and other factors such as the length of time taken for the divestiture, 
Rogowsky classified 75 percent of the divestitures as either deficient or unsuccessful, 
with 28 percent falling into the worst category, unsuccessful.147  
Rogowsky’s metrics for assessing divestitures merit closer scrutiny. Divestitures 
were labeled as unsuccessful if the purchaser of the vertically divested assets had over 
10 percent of the relevant market.148 Not only does owning this much of the market fall 
far short of proving a monopoly, but this example indicates the study’s heavy reliance 
on industry structure to measure competition. This and other measures of competition 
used by Rogowsky, such as whether the purchaser was in the Fortune 200,149 have since 
been discredited as a sufficient basis for establishing a lack of competition.150 Thus, 
Rogowsky labeled divestitures as unsuccessful for having characteristics that are well-
known today to be perfectly consistent with a divestiture that improves competition. 
Additionally, Rogowsky labeled as unsuccessful any divestiture that ordered an 
insufficient size of assets divested—called partial divestitures.151 Many cases were 
classified as unsuccessful because the DOJ or FTC did not order any divestiture, or 
ordered a token amount.152 In other words, if the enforcers had sought larger scale 
divestitures their success rate would have significantly improved by Rogowsky’s own 
metrics. A study that played an important intellectual role in arguments against 
 
exploded after the breakup of AT&T’s monopoly, not before.”). 
143 Clark, supra note x, at 774; See also David Balto, Lessons from the Clinton Administration: 
The Evolving Approach to Merger Remedies, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 952, 958 (2001). 
144  See Robert A. Rogowsky, The Economic Effectiveness of Section 7 Relief, 31 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 187, 212 (1986).  
145 Id. at 189. 
146 Id. at 190. 
147 See id. at 189, 196, 212. 
148 See id. at 189, 196, 218. 
149 See id. 218. 
150 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, The Neal Report and the Crisis in Antitrust, 5 COMPETITION 
POL’Y INT'L 219 (2009) (chronicling the structure-conduct-performance paradigm). 
151 Rogowsky, supra note 151, at 195.  
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divestitures instead is perhaps better viewed as indicating that the government should 
pursue more extensive breakups. 
Using a different methodology, the event study, another examination of 
divestitures through the 1970s drew similarly harsh conclusions. James Ellert 
examined the shareholder returns of firms subject to antitrust divestitures before and 
after those interventions.153 If divestitures were successful, Ellert expected the 
divesting firms to offer lower stock market returns and dividends after the antitrust 
intervention relative to other companies not subject to such interventions. However, 
Ellert found no significant difference in the returns of divesting companies compared 
to those of other companies with different outcomes, such as having the antitrust case 
dismissed.154 Moreover, the authors were unconvinced that anything the antitrust 
authorities did as part of its merger evaluation program effectively reduced any 
monopoly gains. Although the stock value of companies subject to antitrust suits 
dipped by under two percent, Ellert interpreted that drop as resulting from legal and 
other costs of such actions on the firms.155 
Rogowsky’s study helps to clarify the Ellert findings. A large number of 
divestitures never happened, took many years to implement, and required divestiture 
of only a small slice of assets.156 Also, Ellert’s interpretation of the drop of under two 
percent as being attributable to the costs of antitrust action are speculative and reflect 
an average loss.157 Ellert’s study is consistent with some subset of more extensive and 
well-designed divestitures reducing stock market returns.  
A final shortcoming in Ellert’s methodology is the limited value of stock market 
returns as a metric of anticompetitive earnings. Anticompetitive activities may not 
always yield higher profits or increase the value of the firm.158 As a result, if the 
antitrust authorities’ actions had improved competition, the improvements may not be 
seen in stock market returns.  
Even assuming those earlier studies’ methodologies were rigorous, there is further 
reason to doubt their findings’ relevance today. The FTC looked into the administration 
of U.S. divestitures in an examination of all merger orders between 2006 and 2012. 
The success rate for structural remedies was 80 percent, defined as ultimately at least 
restoring competition.159 Moreover, the unsuccessful cases resulted from the FTC 
divesting piecemeal assets.160 When the FTC instead divested an ongoing business 
operation, all of the divestitures succeeded.161 Therefore, the category most relevant to 
breakups consistently succeeded.  
 
153 James C. Ellert, Mergers, Antitrust Law Enforcement and Stockholder Returns, 31 J. FIN. 715, 
715 (1976) (examining firms challenged between 1950 and 1972). 
154 Id. at 715-16, 724. 
155 Id. at 724, 729. 
156 Rogowsky, supra note 144, at 195. 
157 Ellert, supra note 153, at 724–29. 
158 For instance, in theory, the firm may compete away the monopoly rents. Or if employees 
(including executives) captured the rents for higher salaries, successful antitrust interventions would 
not hit shareholder profit. See Crane, supra note 24, at 1192. 
159 Id. at 18 (horizontal mergers). A minority of cases required over two years. Id. 
160 See id. at 1–2 (including which include intellectual property, technology, brand names, 
research and development, and equipment).  
161 Id. at 1, 5 Success meant competition “remained at its premerger level or returned to that level 
within...two to three years.”). Id. 
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The success rate of pre-merger divestitures is not a perfect comparison in terms of 
administering breakups, in part because they tend to be smaller scale.162 Regardless, 
these findings further undermine the prior empirical studies many have cited as 
evidence that antitrust authorities administer structural remedies poorly. In particular, 
because they considered a much later timeframe, the FTC’s studies appear to reflect 
enforcers’ and courts’ improved approach to administering divestitures by 
incorporating lessons learned in the intervening decades.163  
More recent quantitative studies provide mixed results. Based on stock market 
returns, an examination of European Union (EU) pre-merger divestitures concluded 
that divestitures did not lead to significant declines in the stock prices of the firms 
ordered to divest, but that rivals benefited from those divestitures.164 However, besides 
the weakness of stock market value as a metric of antitrust effectiveness, the authors’ 
conclusions provide limited evidence for or against breakups as a remedy because they 
were most critical of the limited scope of those remedies. They believed enforcers 
should go further than partial divestitures to fully blocking mergers,165 an intervention 
that is more akin to a large-scale breakup from a competitive perspective. Stock-
market-based studies of uninhibited breakups could show a stronger impact on 
competition.  
A central limitation of the above examinations is that they fail to deploy the most 
respected empirical mechanism for establishing causality: randomization.166 The 
difficulty of knowing the counter-factual thus undermines all of these antitrust 
empirics. One study addresses that methodological shortcoming by considering the 
Dutch government’s use of randomization in ordering divestitures by gasoline 
companies of stations along major highways.167 The divested gas stations were found 
to lower prices by 1.3% to 2.3%.168 The narrow market context, hospitable nature of 
gas stations to ownership transfer, and foreign jurisdiction heavily limit these findings’ 
relevance to U.S. divestitures. Nonetheless, the most methodologically rigorous study 
available for determining causality indicates that divestitures can improve competition 
in some contexts.  
 
162 See supra Part I.B. Also, for a pre-merger divestiture order the companies can refrain from 
pursuing the proposed merger if they think the ordered divestiture would be harmful. That means 
that the private sector retains a degree of discretion—a check on incompetent administration—that 
it lacks in the case of other types of antitrust divestitures. However, there is limited evidence that 
the private sector has rejected government-ordered divestitures and it would in any case be difficult 
to know whether a private-sector rejection meant the anticompetitive dimensions of the deal had 
been removed. Arguably, to the extent the rejection rate is low, it may actually strengthen the case 
for governmental competence in designing effective divestitures.  
163 FTC 1999 DIVESTITURE STUDY, supra note 43, at 39. 
164 See Tomaso Duso et al., How Effective is European Merger Control?, 55 EUROPEAN ECON. 
REV. 980, 995 (2011).  
165 Duso et al., supra note 164, at 1002. 
166 Dale L. Moore, Recurrent Issues in the Review of Medical Research on Human Subjects, 1 
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(2014). 
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Finally, none of this review’s empirical studies considers deterrence.169 If 
breakups deter firms from pursuing monopolistic mergers, they could improve 
consumer welfare even if the divestiture itself—analyzed narrowly in terms of the 
immediate price effects in the specific market—did not yield evidence of improved 
competition. As a result, some of the divestitures labeled “failures” in the Rogowsky 
study or as having only a minimal impact on stock price analyzed by Ellert could—
once deterrence is taken into account—be viewed as successful.  
In summary, the most influential studies shaping pessimism about governmental 
administration of breakups relied on questionable methodologies and are outdated. 
More recent studies even provide grounds for cautious optimism that larger 
government-ordered divestitures may yield high success rates. More importantly, there 
is an absence of compelling evidence against breakups despite an array of government 
interventions to separate large firms, including electric companies, railroads, banks, 
movie theaters, and television companies, among others.170 The research is limited by 
the lack of sophisticated quantification of the effects of divestitures on consumer 
welfare, by the failure to consider deterrence, and by the absence of large breakups in 
the past few decades. Those limitations further underscore the speculative nature of 
claims about the government being too incompetent to administer breakups.  
 
III. A BALANCED VIEW OF BREAKUPS 
 
Given the limited evidentiary foundations for harsh perceptions of breakup 
administration, the hostility to that remedy deserves fresh examination. This Part 
expands the lens on breakups by situating them in their broader business and law 
enforcement contexts. The literature on private sector divestitures and the goals of 
antitrust are in tension with core assumptions of breakups as too extreme, complicated, 
and harmful. 
 
A.  Insights from Private Divestitures 
   
Antitrust scholars have largely ignored research concerning an even more 
numerous category of divestitures: those occurring in the private sector. As a threshold 
matter, it is helpful to recognize the frequency of private divestitures. In the midst of a 
growing economy and strong stock market, a 2019 survey of senior corporate 
executives found that 84 percent of respondent companies were planning a voluntary 
divestiture within the next two years.171 Well over three thousand private divestitures 
occur each year in the United States.172 In contrast, the FTC listed only about fifteen 
 
169 See Rogowsky, supra note 151, at 189. Over-deterrence is also problematic.  
170 See Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Public Utility Holding Company Act A Model for Breaking Up 
the Banks That Are Too-Big-to-Fail?, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 821 (2011); see also Khan, supra note 38, 
at 1037-51; Barach Orbach, The Paramount Decrees: Lessons for the Future, Antitrust Source, 
April 2020, at 2. 
171 See PAUL HAMMES, GLOBAL CORPORATE DIVESTMENT STUDY, EY 2 (2019), 
https://assets.ey.com/content/dam/ey-sites/ey-
com/en_gl/topics/divestment/2019/global_divestment_study_report.pdf (reporting survey results 
from 930 senior corporate executives). 
172 See Paula Loop, When a Piece of Your Company No Longer Fits: What Boards Need to Know 
About Divestitures, HARV. L. SCH. F. CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (July 27, 2017), 
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divestiture orders annually to alter proposed or consummated mergers in its latest 
divestiture study, or for less than one percent of all mergers and acquisitions.173 If for 
no other reason, the universe of private sector divestitures merits attention because of 
the considerably larger volume of cases to be studied. 
 
1. Are Private Divestitures Too Different To Be Helpful?  
 
The antitrust scholarly omission of private divestitures is to some extent 
understandable. After all, there are many differences between the two enterprises. Most 
importantly, antitrust divestitures aim to lessen a potential source of monopoly profits, 
whereas private divestitures aim to increase the value (including the long-term profits) 
of the company.174 Antitrust scholars might resist comparisons due to that distinction 
and because it changes the composition of divestitures—making it less likely, for 
instance, that private divestitures will create two horizontal competitors.175 
Additionally, a portion of private sector divestitures are conglomerates selling an 
unconnected business. These differences indicate boundaries for finding antitrust 
lessons in private divestitures.  
However, to observe that there are differences between private and public 
divestitures, and that we must limit inferences accordingly, is to state the obvious. The 
more challenging question is how much the differences matter in light of the project. 
Since the project here is to shed greater light on antitrust breakups from a starting point 
of limited evidence, the existing differences warrant further examination.  
Resistance to considering private divestitures due to the prevalence of private 
equity sales of conglomerate pieces would reflect an outdated view. Even in the 1980s 
and 1990s, a large portion of divestitures were not by conglomerates.176 Since then the 
field has shifted considerably. Observers traditionally saw private divestitures as 
helping bring firms “back to their basics” by shedding peripheral assets, often during 
times of financial distress.177 Over time, executives have increasingly pursued larger 
divestitures for strategic reasons rather than to offload unproductive and peripheral 
parts.178 Strategic motives include the advantages of a leaner organization for 
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innovation, cost-cutting, and long-term growth.179 Some businesses have become so 
large and unwieldy that they are beyond the point of gaining economies of scale, and 
their larger size instead creates diseconomies of scale—or increased costs resulting 
from their size.180  
By way of illustration, in 2012 Pfizer announced it would divest about 40 percent 
of its business as part of refocusing on human medicine development.181 The company 
proceeded to shed assets that provided synergies in terms of research and distribution. 
It split off its animal health unit, which develops animal medicines, as a separate 
company in a $13 billion initial public offering (IPO);182 and sold its nutrition business 
to Nestle for $12 billion dollars.183 As another example, Hewlett-Packard executives 
opted for a breakup to respond to the increasing pace of technology-driven markets. 
CEO Meg Whitman described the strategy by observing, “Being nimble is the only 
path to winning.”184 The expansive motives for pursuing divestitures and the diversity 
of assets separated mean that private divestitures offer many case studies that are 
potentially relevant to various antitrust breakup contexts.  
As to the observation that private divestitures differ by aiming to increase the 
firm’s value, that distinction speaks more to the goals rather than to the administration. 
If the private sector demonstrates success splitting up large integrated companies, that 
experience can provide insights into how or whether antitrust authorities should do 
something similar, even if the goals for the breakup are different.  
For instance, Scott Morton’s skepticism about a Facebook-Instagram breakup 
echoes the view of many antitrust scholars because it was based on the observation that 
those two companies would be integrated by the time the breakup occurred.185 Indeed, 
since 2001 in merger approval cases, antitrust authorities brought their only two 
post-merger divestitures within three years of the merger.186 If the source of 
resistance is the degree of integration rather than the particular shape, it is a relevant 
inquiry to probe how the private sector has approached the divestiture of companies 
integrated to a comparable degree.  
A note is in order on what is meant by integrated. In the case of Facebook and 
Instagram, the integration would largely mean technical platform connections—such 
as enabling users on one platform to message users on another.187 The two social media 
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2020]              I N  D E F E N S E  O F  B R E A K U P S  23 
platforms would still under normal circumstances operate as distinct business units 
within the company, supported by common company-wide functions. Also, consumers 
would continue to be able to interface with the two platforms as distinct products, in 
the sense of being able to use one and not the other.  
If observers are searching for divestiture case studies to understand a given 
possible antitrust breakup, some of the tens of thousands of private sector breakups in 
recent years could—from an administration standpoint—offer some appeal. Many 
involve the separation of horizontal businesses, technology companies, prior mega-
mergers. They are at least as likely to offer some insights, if not overall better matches, 
than the AT&T or Standard Oil breakups that tend to dominate the antitrust discussions 
of tech breakups.  
The point is not that any particular private sector divestiture is a clear model for 
any particular proposed breakup, such as the eBay-PayPal merger and subsequent 
divestiture as a roadmap for Facebook-Instagram.188 Large divestitures, public or 
private, tend towards uniqueness. Pointing out that a given proposed private sector 
breakup is different from any given public sector breakup for any number of reasons 
misses the point.  
Rather the point in discussing the integration-related resistance to the Facebook-
Instagram breakup is to diagnose the type of concern that is prevalent in antitrust 
discussions of breakups. A big part of that broader resistance is not about the 
particularity of the proposed breakup at hand. Instead, many observers demonstrate an 
abstract and generalized concern about breaking up consummated mergers—or 
breaking up the company once it is integrated.189 Those concerns should be informed 
by a set of business questions about how costly, lengthy, and difficult it would be to 
break the particular company up—not the extent to which a prior merger is 
consummated or integrated.  
In other words, for antitrust scholars to recognize what can be gained from a more 
interdisciplinary perspective on breakups, it is necessary to exit the antitrust silo that 
inclines toward labeling private sector divestitures as different. A more productive 
approach is to examine whether the points of commonality yield insights. Although the 
differences are real, it would be misguided to use them as a justification for ignoring 
private divestitures. Since the private sector has undertaken divestitures of integrated 
companies with great frequency, study of those undertakings can speak to key business 
assumptions that have implicitly shaped breakup skepticism.  
 
2. What Insights Might Private Divestitures Offer? 
 
One key difference between private sector and antitrust views of divestitures is 
how to view the prospect of splitting up an integrated company. Executives who are 
deciding whether to divest—and business scholars who study those divestitures—are 
less deterred by the associated risks and costs than observers of antitrust breakups. For 
instance, while the private sector also prefers to sell a separate business unit rather than 
one that is heavily intertwined,190 many strategic divestitures split integrated businesses 
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whose information technology systems have been intertwined for decades.191 Hewlett-
Packard was a fully integrated company—the type of “unitary” company that deters 
courts and enforcers from breakups—when it decided to split into two roughly equal 
halves.192  
Executives pursue such strategic breakups despite awareness of the considerable 
resources and complexity.193 Again, Hewlett-Packard executives knew beforehand that 
the divestiture would take several years to complete, cost an estimated $1.8 billion, 
require extensive administrative management, and cause great “upheaval” within the 
company.194 They proceeded despite that awareness and produced two highly 
profitable companies.195  
What about in the context of technology-heavy deals? Antitrust scholars have 
urged particular caution in pursuing post-merger breakups in that space.196 The private 
sector has no such reservations, pursuing a number of divestitures years after 
consummation. Examples include PayPal and eBay, which had technologically 
integrated their platforms by the time the combined company decided to split, and 
AOL-Time Warner.197 
Another perspective comes from shareholders, who also demonstrate relative 
comfort with divestitures. Following unprofitable mergers and acquisitions, 
shareholders regularly pressure their managers to undo those consummated mergers 
even years later.198 In contrast, as described above, antitrust authorities have 
consistently declined to undo an anticompetitive merger mistakenly approved, even 
though they acknowledge—as have a large number of scholars—that such mistakes 
have occurred.199 In other words, antitrust enforcers almost never fix their prior 
mistakes by breaking up a company, but shareholders regularly fix their managers’ 
mistakes by forcing a breakup.  
Of course, administrative costs may be systematically higher in forced 
divestitures, which are inherently adversarial processes. Higher administrative costs 
would be expected particularly if the parties frequently argue over details, requiring 
more court interventions and likely slowing the merger down. These differences are 
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real but some context for them is helpful. Studies have found that private acquisitions 
are often subject to litigation—over 90% by 2011.200 Thus, private divestitures are 
subject to court delays. They also tend to last years and take longer than executives 
expect.201  
The point here is not that private and public divestitures involve the same costs. 
Antitrust breakup costs higher than private sector divestitures may be avoidable with 
effective regulatory design,202 but large-scale breakups will inevitably be complex, 
expensive, and lengthy. However, the private sector perspective indicates that many 
observers may have inflated negative perceptions of the administrative costs by 
attributing what is unavoidable—or at least what also occurs in the private sector—to 
government incompetence. The real question should be whether the inescapably high 
costs of the breakup are worth the benefits. 
The current antitrust analysis may underestimate those benefits. Some, if not most, 
breakups would be expected to create non-antitrust-related value through the types of 
efficiency and nimbleness that motivate private sector divestitures. To elaborate, non-
antitrust benefits may remain unrealized due to factors such as agency costs, emotional 
barriers, or because the monopoly rents outweigh the divestiture gains.203 Independent 
of those considerations, however, any number of current companies might benefit from 
divestitures without those benefits being sufficient to justify the costs of the divestiture. 
Suppose that it would cost a company $500 million to implement a private divestiture, 
and the efficiency and innovation gains of the divestiture amount to $400 million, that 
company will not rationally choose to divest. However, if the government were to break 
up that company for independent antitrust reasons, the $400 million in efficiency gains 
would need to be added to the benefits side of the breakup—even though they would 
not be the motivating factor.  
Whether or not that $400 million would rightly be seen as lowering the costs of 
administration is debatable, but ultimately unimportant. Those side benefits of 
breakups could in some contexts offset even higher governmental costs of 
administering breakups. More importantly, the cost-benefit analysis could significantly 
underestimate the benefits of breakups because the antitrust literature pays so little 
attention to private sector divestitures.  
Private sector divestitures also inform the high “failure” rate of antitrust 
divestitures in the 1950s through 1970s that tainted observers’ assessment of the 
remedy.204 By most accounts, a large portion of all M&A transactions have 
questionable value, with a representative study putting the failure rate at almost half of 
all deals.205 Scholars similarly conclude that private sector divestitures have “mixed 
results.”206  
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Of course, the different metrics do not allow straight comparisons of success rates 
across antitrust and the private sector.207 But large private and antitrust divestitures are 
both at their core about dividing a company into pieces. Thus, private sector success 
rates can provide perspective on overlapping issues faced in antitrust breakups.  
One of those is how to interpret evidence of a government breakup being costly, 
messy, and potentially failing. The failure rates in the private sector raise the issue of 
whether legal scholars unfairly blamed unavoidable challenges on government 
incompetence. Business scholars who view over 70% of private sector deals as 
“abysmal failures” do not recommend that executives abandon them.208 Instead, they 
view failures as indicating opportunities to improve.209  
The business sector’s persistence in the face of many failed reorganizations has 
brought benefits in the case of divestitures. Studies have consistently concluded that 
divestitures overall increase shareholder value, despite administrative challenges.210 
The data also indicates that certain types add significantly more value, such as larger 
divestitures.211  
If intellectuals had convinced business leaders to abandon large private 
divestitures based on the high failure rates evident in the 1980s it would have hurt the 
economy on a large-scale. Yet intellectuals used flawed evidence of antitrust breakup 
failure to convince authorities to abandon that remedy starting in the 1980s. 
Competition may have consequently suffered on a large-scale basis due to that faulty 
evidentiary interpretation.   
Although differences must be considered in comparing corporate divestitures to 
antitrust divestitures, such comparisons should be made rather than ignored. Many 
important questions still remain unanswered in the business literature on divestitures.212 
Still, that literature is far more expansive, recent, and rigorous than the corresponding 
antitrust literature.  
Situating antitrust remedies in the broader context of private sector 
reorganizations shows how the picture painted of breakups has become distorted. The 
costs of breakups are not as high as antitrust scholars and judges commonly assume. 
Businesses regularly expend considerable funds on organizational streamlining and 
system updating. To estimate the accurate costs for an antitrust breakup, it would be 
necessary to only count those expenses that would not have otherwise been incurred. 
It would also be necessary to lower the estimated “cost” of administering breakups by 
the gains from efficiency and nimbleness, which are currently omitted from relevant 
antitrust remedy analyses.  
An isolated analysis also risks implying that complications and delays are the fault 
of courts or enforcers, rather than features of divestitures. Indeed, one of the factors 
driving some CEOs to pursue a reorganization is the belief that the company “needs to 
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be shaken up.”213 Executives are even willing to divide a company up along new lines 
that do not reflect a prior merger.  
That private sector mindset sits in stark contrast to the widespread conception of 
even the more straightforward category of antitrust breakup—consummated mergers—
as analogous to “unscrambling the egg.”214 Whereas nobody tries to unscramble eggs, 
sophisticated and successful business leaders routinely carve up their own integrated 
companies despite inevitable transaction costs and decades of evidence that many fail. 
The hostility to breakups is partly born of the disciplinary and academic silo in which 
breakup conversations have persisted. 
 
B.  Shareholder Harm Is Not an Obstacle 
 
The Supreme Court has historically emphasized that “the Government cannot be 
denied the [divestiture] remedy because economic hardship, however severe, may 
result.”215 Nonetheless, concerns about shareholders have persisted as a factor 
influencing the remedy choice.216 Indeed, in fighting the government’s proposal of a 
breakup, Microsoft wanted the court to consider “[t]estimony from Goldman, Sachs & 
Co. and from Morgan Stanley Dean Witter that dissolution would adversely affect 
shareholder value.”217 The district court declined to do so, and in overturning the order 
of a breakup, the Court of Appeals cited the value of hearing that shareholder 
testimony.218 The rest of this Part shows why judges should not worry about significant 
shareholder harm, because it is unlikely to happen and may be economically desirable 
if it does.  
If the concern about shareholders comes from fear of harm to people’s retirement 
and savings, the evolving structure of equity ownership is relevant. Most publicly 
traded shares of large companies now are owned by mutual funds and other institutional 
owners holding diverse stocks. As a result, the impact of any given breakup would be 
diluted for most shareholders. Additionally, improved long-term health of markets 
encouraged by antitrust could benefit most of a given company’s shareholders even if 
a broken up company’s stock was hurt. Indeed, the authors of the leading study of 
divestitures’ impact on stock value concluded that divestitures led to a transfer of 
monopoly rents from the prosecuted company to rivals.219 
Even if the concern is solely about an individual company, a perhaps obvious point 
is that a breakup does not mean that a portion of the company is eliminated. If Google 
is forced to sell YouTube or Facebook is required to divest Instagram, shareholders 
would receive a massive payment for that sale.220 Overall, the literature consistently 
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shows that private divestitures “have a positive impact on the divesting parent’s share 
price.”221  
There has been limited direct study of the effects on shareholders of breakups. 
Moreover, what few studies exist did not examine the ultimate question of how 
breakups would compare to other antitrust remedies. Nonetheless, the leading 
quantitative research into stock value following antitrust divestitures suggests that the 
organizational reconfiguration does not significantly drive the stock value down.222  
Nor have the most far-reaching antitrust breakups necessarily hurt shareholders. 
In its failed Supreme Court appeal of dissolution, Standard Oil warned that dissolution 
would be calamitous to shareholders—a possibility that could not be ruled out with 
confidence at the time because such a case was unprecedented.223 But within a year of 
the court order to dissolve Standard Oil, the company’s total stock value had increased 
since the case was announced.224 Within two years of the court-ordered divestiture, 
founder John D. Rockefeller’s wealth tripled.225 It is impossible to know the 
counterfactual, but the breakup was not—as predicted by Standard Oil’s lawyers—
calamitous to shareholders.  
Of course, because historical antitrust breakups were often poorly designed, more 
powerful antitrust divestitures may lead to different results. If most scholars are correct 
that the AT&T breakup overall increased competition,226 that case study is illustrative. 
Going into the case, the government was concerned about hardship to AT&T’s 
shareholders.227 Nonetheless, those who held their shares benefitted substantially 
following the breakup.228  
How might breakups fail to harm shareholders even while improving competition? 
Maintaining a monopoly can be expensive.229 Instead of focusing on defensive 
protection of a dominant market position, firms in a competitive industry pursue greater 
adaptability and may invest more in innovation.230 That renewal has the potential to 
grow the industry at a faster rate than in an industry dominated by a monopolist. Faster-
moving companies may be even more important in light of the increasing pace with 
which technologies are requiring companies to adapt.231 
Agency theory and organizational psychology help to explain this conundrum of 
effective antitrust breakups still increasing shareholder value. Senior managers have 
often pursued growth, especially through mergers and acquisitions, even when growth 
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would not improve the company’s value.232 Yet many companies hold those 
acquisitions even after it is clear that they were failures, only divesting them when 
forced to do so by shareholders.233 Agency theory views these divestitures as 
demonstrating a misalignment of incentives: managers’ compensation was often more 
dependent on the size of the company, whereas owners care more about profit.234 Or 
executives may direct a large share of the monopoly rents toward salaries, while the 
portion shared with shareholders does not offset the corresponding costs.235 
Because the design of executive compensation structures has improved, CEOs’ 
motivation to grow counterproductively is presumably lessened today compared to 
decades ago.236 Moreover, increasing external pressures on managers—including from 
activist shareholders237—have presumably made inaction in the face of value-creating 
reorganizations less likely. Nonetheless, the agency problem persists.238 Moreover, 
there is some evidence that organizational inertia and emotional factors may cause 
companies to hold on to assets that they would economically benefit from divesting.239 
Another way of conceptualizing the potential benefits to shareholders is to view 
antitrust breakups as a tool of corporate governance to push executives away from self-
serving acquisitions.240 A primary goal of corporate law is to align the incentives of 
shareholders and managers—by, for instance, imposing a fiduciary duty on 
managers.241 Yet it is costly for shareholders to monitor and influence their agents in 
the firm—managers and directors—which helps explain why “[t]he problem of 
managerial agency costs dominates debates in corporate law.”242 By discouraging 
managers from pursuing growth that harms shareholders, or by encouraging beneficial 
divestitures, antitrust enforcers may in some instances benefit shareholders by 
addressing a harmful effects of those high agency costs.  
It is unclear what percent of breakups would add value to shareholders by solving 
agency costs or otherwise improving the firm’s performance. But recent empirical 
evidence indicates that when CEOs propose mergers, “there is a very large thumb on 
the scale that pushes all deals toward approval.”243 It is plausible that a substantial 
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portion of antitrust breakups would not harm shareholders, and many may even benefit 
them. Of course, it is not, and should not be, the goal of antitrust to break up a company 
to bring shareholders unrealized gains. Still, the evidence available suggests that any 
resistance to breakups out of concern of significant harm to shareholders rests on weak 
foundations. 
Despite the absence of evidence of extreme harm to shareholders in the past, to 
the extent that a monopoly is earning considerable profits from its market dominance, 
lower stock value would be expected following at least some effective breakups. 
Putting aside for now the questions surrounding deterrence and fairness,244 what does 
the private sector literature on divestitures add to this issue?  
As the primary tool for assessing corporate law and antitrust, efficiency would 
presumably weigh heavily in the comparison of shareholder interests to consumer 
welfare.245 Antitrust laws arguably already prioritize consumer welfare over the 
monopoly owners’ interests.246 To that preexisting hierarchy, this Article has 
illuminated another efficiency contributor omitted from those analyses: Breakups can 
“help ensure that managers only retain “assets for which [their firms] have a 
comparative advantage and sell assets as soon as another firm can manage them more 
efficiently.”247 That additional efficiency consideration further weakens the argument 
for letting shareholder harm obstruct breakups.  
In summary, substantial valuation drops as a result of breakups are uncertain to 
happen and of little societal concern if they do.  Indeed, as the next section shows, even 
if every future breakup harms monopolies’ shareholders, that result may be valuable to 
addressing monopolies. 
 
C.  Costly Breakups May Increase Deterrence 
 
The discussion so far has questioned whether breakup costs are prohibitively high, 
especially viewed through the private sector lens on such costs. But the argument has 
yet to interrogate the predominant assumption in the literature that high breakup costs 
are unequivocally bad.248 Upon closer examination, that assumption is incomplete.  
Of course, holding all else equal, it is no doubt desirable to expend fewer public 
resources and seek minimal waste to achieve the same antitrust goal. Nonetheless, to 
be effective, antitrust remedies must keep companies from seeking monopoly power in 
the future.249 As mentioned above, however, the existing empirical critiques that 
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labeled breakups a failure did not consider deterrence.250 In other words, the indictment 
of breakups is uninformed by arguably the field’s main function, because “U.S. 
antitrust policy is primarily a deterrence system.”251 
One reason for that omission is that the difficulty in measuring deterrence makes 
it impossible to draw firm conclusions.252 However, breakups must play a central role 
in the architecture of antitrust. Unlike in Europe, where “the civil fine is the tool of 
choice,”253 U.S. “antitrust laws do not now provide for a civil penalty for 
monopolization.”254 Nor do antitrust enforcers exercise their ability to pursue 
disgorgement, which requires a monopoly firm to give up its illegal profits.255 The costs 
imposed by a breakup are thus a potential substitute for the deterrent effects of 
disgorgement and civil penalties.256 For instance, if remedies were only pursued when 
they imposed minimal burdens on companies, then there would be few downsides for 
companies pursuing anticompetitive mergers: In the worst case scenario, they still gain 
because they keep the monopoly profits they earn until the low-cost breakup.257 
The current breakup paradigm also gives businesses a blueprint for strategically 
positioning themselves to avoid breakups. Scholars and courts have emphasized that 
although it is relatively easy to split a company up when it has merged but kept its 
operations separate, it would be unwise to break up those same companies once 
integrated.258 In 2012, an FTC Bureau of Competition director clarified in an official 
statement that the agency “is most likely to . . . divest an autonomous, on-going 
business unit that comprises at least one party’s entire business in the relevant 
market.”259 That policy seeks to ensure that the divested “business unit contains all 
components necessary to operate autonomously, that it has operated autonomously, 
that it is segregable from the parent, and that the unit’s buyer will be able to maintain 
or restore competition almost immediately.”260  
Courts have offered related details for merging companies wishing to avoid a later 
breakup. If a business that merged illegally has been together for some length of time, 
the court will look at investments made after the merger that may be diminished as a 
result of the breakup. In the case of two hospitals that merged seven years earlier in 
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violation of antitrust law, for instance, divestiture was found to be too costly because 
the combined company had invested in improvements to a cardiac surgery program 
and computer systems.261 A divestiture could cause delays in the surgery program and 
glitches in the computer systems.262   
The implication from these guidance statements and court orders is that executives 
running a monopoly—whether built organically or through illicit mergers—can 
improve their chances of never being broken up by integrating all business units. The 
current framework incentivizes executives to make rapid investments, such as in 
common technological interfaces that link different parts of the company and ensure 
that no significant piece operates autonomously.  
Anecdotal evidence points to such strategic positioning. After a wave of calls to 
break up Facebook in 2018 took particular aim at its acquisition of Instagram and 
WhatsApp,263 CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced plans to connect these platforms more 
closely.264 Similarly, telecom companies were motivated by breakup fears in designing 
an integrated structure rather than seeking to retain separate modules.265  
Thus, there is reason to believe that companies strategically take steps post-merger 
to lessen the likelihood of authorities breaking them up.266 That maneuvering may help 
explain the dearth of breakups if savvy businesses are systematically able to integrate 
more quickly than antitrust authorities can learn that a merger was anticompetitive. 
Although other reasons exist to integrate, excess integration motivated by breakup 
avoidance is wasteful. Excess integration is thus doubly harmful, through both short-
term higher costs and long-term thwarting of antitrust. Yet these skewed incentives are 
omitted from the recent literature on breakups.267 
Additionally, it will be difficult if not impossible for executives to rigorously 
compare any harms to the company of excess integration, such as the business being 
“too big to manage.”268 But identifying potential benefits of avoiding a breakup would 
be more concrete, in the sense of avoiding a costly reorganization. Indeterminacy of 
estimating breakup effects plagues questions about deterrence, making it impossible to 
know whether antitrust currently over-deters or under-deters.269 There is a risk of over-
deterring—which could prevent some beneficial mergers or investment in innovation. 
However, the weight the evidence suggests that antitrust enforcers have been more 
likely to err on the side of underenforcement.270 This Article’s demonstration of the 
underappreciated analytic and institutional resistance to breakups strengthens the case 
for concluding that the current antitrust framework under-deters.271 
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In the extreme, in theory costly breakups could be preferable to cost-free breakups 
if the benefits of improving deterrence outweighed the administrative waste. From a 
more realistic perspective, the implication is that the unavoidable costs of breakups can 
provide societal benefits by discouraging anticompetitive mergers and inefficient 
comingling. To be clear, enforcers should not purposefully make breakups extra 
costly.272 But understood as a byproduct of improving firm-level efficiency, deterrence, 
and competition, substantial breakup administration costs can contribute to an optimal 
antitrust policy.  
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS 
 
The statutory root of antitrust authority, the Sherman Act, did not specify the 
remedy of divestiture.273 Instead, that authority flows from courts’ equity powers, and 
“is flexible and capable of nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public 
interest and private needs as well as between competing private claims.”274 As a result, 
a shift toward viewing breakups as administrable can immediately improve antitrust 
without changing statutes or upending doctrine. Breakup administration also speaks to 
possible legislative reforms to antitrust that could better address monopolies.  
 
A.  Administering Breakups 
 
In assessing breakups as a remedy, the question is how the government might 
perform today rather than how it performed decades ago. The literature on private 
sector breakups emphasizes that the success of divestitures varies depending on the 
design and management of the process.275 Three principles are important for designing 
the administration of antitrust breakups: leveraging business sector expertise, 
streamlining court involvement, and remaining open to large breakups.  
The first of these principles, business expertise, is important in light of perhaps 
the primary sources of resistance to breakups: “Judges aren’t good at breaking up 
companies.”276 Observers are right to doubt courts’ competence in administering such 
day-to-day business decisions. However, that critique of breakups reflects an 
antiquated understanding of governance.  
Since the last large-scale breakup, many agencies have evolved toward what 
scholars have described as “new governance” and “collaborative” methods of 
regulation.277 These and related concepts speak to regulatory process design and are 
most closely associated among legal scholars with administrative law.278 In the context 
of breakup administration, this model of governance would encourage the regulator to 
leverage private-sector expertise and knowledge rather than recreating it.279 The 
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Environmental Protection Agency, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, and other 
agencies now pervasively rely on large businesses to develop internal self-regulatory 
processes, often in the compliance department, or through third-party inspectors. The 
agencies then monitor or manage the firm’s internal self-policing infrastructure.280  
These new governance models allow the agency to benefit from the firm’s skill in 
designing the best path to achieving a regulatory goal.281 A key feature of the design is 
establishing a regular dialogue with regulated entities, in which the regulator learns 
about and assesses the process and outputs.282 Viewed through this more expansive 
new governance lens, the competence of the government in designing and managing 
breakups should not be the determinative factor in assessing whether breakups are 
administrable. 
By some measures, the FTC has been slower than other agencies in shifting toward 
new governance. For instance, whereas the CFPB and EPA have about as may lawyers 
as monitors (examiners and inspectors), the FTC enforces the law almost entirely 
through lawyers.283 But the FTC has shown an openness to relying on private parties, 
such as independent third-party monitors in divestitures.284 Assuming a large gap exists 
between the FTC’s tactics and regulatory best practices, the differences should lend 
further confidence that improvements in its historic approach to breakups are possible 
by moving closer to administrative best practices. 
How would these principles translate into administering breakups? Space 
constraints do not allow for a comprehensive sketch of the process, but the literature in 
finance, strategy management, and business organization provides insights into how to 
administer breakups more effectively. Success factors include involving middle 
managers in implementation,285 and adopting an effective communication campaign 
with employees.286  
Antitrust enforcers should not be expected to become experts on these various 
details—although hiring industry divestiture experts as antitrust agency employees 
may help. Enforcers can to some extent leverage the monopoly’s internal 
reorganization capabilities, but relying on a self-serving firm’s workforce as the main 
source of business expertise would be a mistake. Thus, enforcers can increase the 
chances that the breakup benefits consumers by requiring the firm to pay for outside 
reorganization experts.  
Hiring outside experts to run the breakup is essential because research into private, 
voluntary divestitures supports the commonsense notion that “serial divesters,” or 
firms that regularly divest, perform far better at divestitures.287 Yet the dearth of large-
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scale antitrust breakups means that antitrust enforcers lack that experience, including 
the ability to identify what key information the firm may be hiding that is crucial to a 
successful divestiture.288 Nor are monopolies themselves likely to be serial divesters, 
even if their advice could be trusted. Hiring outside experts brings serial divestiture 
expertise into the process, since those entities not only have experience in designing 
effective reorganizations, but in knowing what information they must request of a firm 
to make effective decisions.  
An inevitable challenge is that reorganization experts specialize in adding value 
to the firm rather than promoting competition. Again, the literature on new governance 
proves instructive though. To some extent, a similar argument could be made about 
other industries—that firms specialize in making profits, not in enforcing the law—so 
why situate compliance within the firm? Part of the answer is that the goal is to build 
on as much private sector expertise as possible before adding the public regulatory 
layer. Another way of thinking about this is that a reorganization is difficult enough, 
so whether the third-party consultants can help with 50 percent, 75 percent, or 90 
percent of the process, it is better to leverage that business knowledge rather than 
ignoring it.  
Moreover, the enforcer and trustee would still be involved in managing the design 
of the plan, in an iterative process. There would thus be a team component to the 
breakup administration process, weighing various options from both perspectives. The 
enforcer brings the deeper understanding of what would improve competition that the 
private sector consultants may lack.  
That reporting structure speaks to a related concern. The close working 
relationship with the monopoly in developing the breakup plan risks industry capture 
of the process. A captured third-party expert or regulator could encourage breakups 
that place excess weight on increasing the value of the firm. To address that risk, the 
monopoly should be required to pay for the third-party experts, but not be allowed to 
choose them—or at least should not have the final word. Moreover, the third-party 
experts should agree not to later serve the firms involved in the divestiture for a certain 
number of years afterwards to avoid conflicts of interest. Additionally, it would reduce 
capture potential that the consultant would report to and need to have its breakup plan 
approved by the FTC, DOJ, or other government representative prioritizing 
competition. These and other adjustments would need to be implemented into the 
design of breakup administration to address the unavoidable challenges in such a large-
scale public-private undertaking.  
Although third-party reorganization services can cost millions of dollars, firms 
often hire such experts when they voluntarily merge and reorganize.289 Regardless, 
imposing additional expenses alongside the breakup could help fill the gap of civil 
penalties in addressing monopolies, thereby making divestitures more deterrent.290 The 
purpose is not to increase the costs of the breakup, but the deterrence upside potentially 
makes such administration-improving costs more acceptable.  
 
288 Even with adequate expertise, limited resources create obstacles. 
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To some, a privatized breakup process will seem suboptimal. It is debatable 
whether it would be preferable for administrative agencies to have the capabilities to 
design and oversee the day-to-day details of breakups. Similarly, there would be 
benefits to judges to having the resources and competence to swiftly rule on objections 
from the monopolist along the way. But that is not the world that exists, and it would 
require massive government overhauls and increases in public expenditures to get 
there.  
The more relevant question is whether the addition of third-party reorganization 
expertise—which can be implemented without doctrinal, organizational, or 
expenditure changes—is a substantial improvement over breakups run by government 
authorities with limited expertise and resources. More generally, to reject breakups 
based on either an assumption that the government must do everything or a mistrust of 
collaborative governance is to hold antitrust to a different standard than other regulators 
face.291 
The second principle is to streamline as much as possible the court’s involvement 
in designing and implementing the breakup. Avoiding protracted legal wrangling about 
the details is important because one of the biggest administrability critiques of breakups 
is excess delay.292 A similar problem has motivated new governance models that aim 
to move from an adversarial to a cooperative relationship.293 Rather than the agency 
and firm fighting through court orders to hand over information, the goal is a problem-
solving approach in which the firm and the regulated entity work together towards a 
common compliance goal.294  
Both the regulator’s authority and its approach are relevant to avoiding repeatedly 
going to court over many details of the breakup. Of course, the monopoly should have 
a means of weighing in on and submitting evidence about the choice of remedy and the 
shape of the breakup. At the same time, courts should exercise their discretion to avoid 
what Microsoft had requested: “substantial discovery, adequate time for preparation 
and a full trial on relief.”295 When courts grant those requests by deep-pocketed 
companies, they greatly increase the costs of pursuing a breakup. The monopoly thus 
succeeds in making that particular case more difficult for resource-strapped enforcers 
and in weakening the intellectual argument for breakups by providing yet another 
example of a bogged down, expensive case. 
Although many approaches might streamline court involvement, a straightforward 
path would be to return to the long-established tendency to defer to enforcers’ remedy 
design. Prior to Microsoft, after finding antitrust liability, courts were more willing to 
defer to agencies on the question of remedy.296 That approach makes more sense in 
light of what Rebecca Haw Allensworth has identified as the “adversarial economics” 
problem in antitrust, in which courts struggle to determine the winner of the “battle of 
the experts” hired by each party.297 One of Allensworth’s solutions is to provide courts 
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with access to third-party expert testimony.298 Another way of conceptualizing the 
hiring of third-party reorganization experts is as addressing that dueling economists 
problem, but outside of the delay-filled court process. 
To further improve expediency and expertise, the court should also delegate 
considerable process administration to a court-appointed trustee, ideally one with deep 
antitrust and private sector divestiture experience. In recent years, courts have 
increasingly relied on these parties—sometimes called a special master or monitor—
to oversee antitrust remedies.299 The trustee has unrestricted access to the monopoly, 
and communicates to the DOJ or FTC any anticompetitive conduct observed.300 These 
court-appointed monitors have in many fields become a standard means to “police the 
firm” following court orders.301  
The regulatory structure for breakups would thus be best understood as the trustee 
running the day-to-day process subject to veto by the antitrust enforcer. The trustee and 
enforcer would oversee a private sector workforce of third-party reorganization experts 
paid for by the monopoly, in addition to the monopoly’s internal experts who inform 
the breakup plan. Courts would provide a check on the process but should only become 
involved in unusual circumstances once the breakup process is underway, with heavy 
deference to the enforcer and trustee-run plan. Perhaps court involvement would be 
mostly limited to situations in which the enforcer disagreed with the trustee, or some 
high bar such as abuse of discretion. Those limits are important to ensure that the 
breakup process stays streamlined.  
A third principle for effective administration is removing the government 
inhibition about pursuing far-reaching breakups. One of the most consistent findings 
in the empirical literatures on both private and antitrust divestitures is that smaller 
divestitures leave the separated assets with insufficient resources to compete.302 
Additionally, smaller divestitures may leave the monopoly too large and fail to produce 
a sufficiently fragmented industry. The FTC’s own study of merger approvals 
concluded as much, since all of its divestitures of ongoing businesses succeeded, 
“suggesting that the more limited scope of the asset package increases the risk that a 
remedy will not succeed.”303  
Antitrust authorities appear to have internalized some of those lessons in the past 
few years. Aside from speeches proclaiming as much,304 enforcers also in 2018 
required the largest divestiture ever, a $9 billion divestiture required in the 
Bayer/Monsanto deal, along with another sizeable divestiture to DISH as part of the 
Spring-T-Mobile deal.305 Granted, those large merger-approval divestitures are small 
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in number, involve the sale of assets to other multinational companies rather than the 
creation of a standalone company, and amount to a fraction of the size of what the sale 
of Instagram would be, for instance.306 Thus, those deals are more limited and likely 
different in form than would be the case in breaking up some of today’s largest 
companies. Nonetheless, the trend toward larger pre-merger divestitures indicates that 
antitrust enforcers may recognize the benefits to competition of larger divestitures.  
Ironically, the reluctance since the 1980s to push for large breakups stems in part 
from a fear of messing something up.307 But by holding back out of fear of mistakes, 
enforcers make it less probable that those divestitures will succeed as ongoing 
businesses. Rather than avoiding damage, the antitrust Hippocratic oath has caused 
harm.308 Courts and enforcers must be willing not only to pursue breakups, but also to 
design them to fully address the problem—by analogy, to remove the entire cancerous 
tumor rather than only part of it.  
This discussion is not meant to provide an exhaustive list of administrative best 
practices. For instance, it would also be ideal to consider accompanying breakups with 
penalties, to the extent that the costs of a breakup are deemed insufficient for optimal 
deterrence. Nor should the discussion be taken as suggesting that antitrust breakups as 
described here would be a straightforward undertaking. Like any private reorganization 
and any government intervention in private affairs, they would often prove messy and 
imperfect.  
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that the historical approach to administering 
breakups can be meaningfully improved upon—a process that has already begun. 
Moreover, as antitrust enforcers gain experience administering breakups they will 
become better process supervisors.309 In addition to leveraging existing private sector 
experience, regulators should adopt the prevailing corporate mindset recognizing 
glitches as parts of a worthwhile process. Unavoidable setbacks provide opportunities 
to improve administration rather than reason to abandon a remedy that is well within 
modern collaborative regulators’ sphere of competence.  
 
B.  Choosing Breakups 
 
This Article’s main implication concerns enforcers’ and courts’ perception of 
breakups. The predominant discomfort with breakups as a remedy is rooted in two 
misperceptions. The first is that the government is disastrous at administering 
breakups. The second is that the risks of a breakup are tremendous. Neither of these is 
supported in the literature, particularly once breakups are viewed in terms of how they 
would and should be administered today, rather than how they were implemented 
decades ago. 
As a result, at the very least, there is a need for greater openness to deploying 
breakups. As part of this increased openness, courts should view with great skepticism 
dire predictions that breakups will destroy shareholder value, consumer welfare, the 
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industry, or the economy. Faced with a government breakup, businesses have 
historically developed self-serving estimates that later proved to be wrong.310  
The question then becomes how much more than openness is warranted. Is there 
support for a regulatory or judicial default assumption that breakups are the superior 
remedy? Once a firm has violated antitrust law, choosing a remedy amounts to a 
prediction of whether breakups would be superior to other alternatives.  
 
1. Comparing Breakups to Access Remedies  
 
This section focuses on the alternative remedy of mandated access in the post-
merger context. But much of the analysis is relevant to other behavioral remedies and 
to other liability contexts. The focus on access mandates reflects their prevalence in 
recent breakup conversations as the leading alternative suggested instead of breakups. 
Some critiques of AT&T’s dissolution emphasize that a better solution would have 
been to mandate that AT&T allow competitors to use its telephone network.311 One of 
the prominent alternative remedies proposed instead of splitting Instagram from 
Facebook is to require “that Facebook enable open interconnection between itself and 
any new market entrant.”312 The preference by many for this alternative is rooted in a 
skepticism about breakups’ administrability, even in the post-merger context.313 
Additionally, access remedies are more appealing than other behavioral remedies in 
the post-merger context, there may be no conduct to prohibit moving forward that 
would address the prior merger. 
Comparing access remedies to breakups is a context-specific undertaking and thus 
it would be of limited value to attempt to declare one remedy as superior to the other 
overall. Access remedies have the potential to improve consumer welfare, particularly 
in the context of financial and technology platforms or when a breakup would destroy 
what consumers value most in a company.314 Moreover, breakups and access remedies 
together will sometimes be necessary.315 
It would nonetheless be a mistake to view breakups as inherently more costly and 
messy simply because two merged companies have integrated. Scholars have pointed 
out that access remedies require ongoing “sophisticated oversight and dispute 
resolution mechanisms that typically exceed the resources and strengths of the 
enforcement agencies.”316 Although the perception of bad experiences with breakups 
soured antitrust decision-makers, “our experience with conduct remedies has also not 
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been satisfying, and there is little reason to think that such decrees work any better in 
monopolization cases.”317 In the most recent large-scale case that included access 
remedies, Microsoft was involved with the court for sixteen years, until 2011.318 Thus, 
a similar narrative of administrative messiness can be crafted about access remedies as 
exists for breakups.  
Moreover, given the outdated antitrust view of breakups, many observers may 
have compared access remedies implemented recently with breakups administered 
decades ago. A more rigorous comparison would reflect how enforcers would 
administer breakups today—by leveraging private sector expertise.319 Within that 
proper frame of reference, there is no strong evidentiary basis for access remedies as 
more administrable.  
Nor do those arguments in favor of access remedies consider the types of 
economic gains identified in this Article for breakups. The antitrust analysis sees the 
benefits of intervention in terms of consumer welfare, and the remedies as part of the 
costs. However, to those consumer welfare benefits, breakups as a remedy add 
extraneous societal gains of nimbler, more efficient firms.320 Included in those 
overlooked benefits are the reorganization and systems upgrade expenses that can be 
handled during the breakup and that even a well-run monopoly would have undertaken 
anyways.321 Access remedies, and indeed behavioral remedies overall, do not provide 
those additional benefits. For large monopolies, breakups’ added efficiency could be 
substantial.  
These additional considerations may be enough to tip the remedy scale in 
breakups’ favor in many cases. But given the dearth of recent data points available, the 
empirical case for a breakup preference is weak. The safe stance would therefore be to 
declare that the remedy analysis should be undertaken from a place of neutrality. A 
neutral starting point defers the choice of remedy to future sophisticated cost-benefit 
analyses tailored to the facts of a given case.  
There are risks in adopting a facially neutral approach, however. Neutrality 
towards remedies would be ideal if the remedy analysis were truly objective, informed 
by the interdisciplinary empirics relevant to breakups, and able to adjust for deterrence. 
However, arguably the primary “dilemma facing antitrust enforcers is to balance the 
costs and benefits in a world without perfect information.”322 In all likelihood, faced 
with a sophisticated economic argument against breakups from industry, in many cases 
the government’s economists will fail to establish any particular remedy as definitively 
preferable.323  
As a result, despite the intention to remain objective, the decision will still often 
come down to a judgment call. Behavioral economics has shown that unrecognized 
biases influence even experts’ decisions.324 Institutions and ideologies resist change, 
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and even in scientific experiments what people conclude depends partly on what their 
preconceptions have taught them to see.325 Moreover, wealthy firms exert considerable 
influence on the political process and consistently argue against breakups.326 The most 
influential actors in the private sector would thus overall be expected to pressure 
antitrust policy away from breakups. Of course, officials may still choose breakups 
under intense public or political pressure, such as that surrounding their ongoing 
investigations of Amazon, Facebook, and Google.327 But in the absence of such 
extraordinary influence, the psychologically and politically attractive choice for an 
unsure enforcer may be to settle for a remedy other than a breakup. A purportedly 
neutral approach risks amounting to a de facto preference for remedies other than 
breakups.328 
Is a de facto default to behavioral remedies desirable? In theory, a behavioral 
remedy default allows for lighter antitrust intervention. A preference for behavioral 
remedies is thus appropriate when there is concern about over-enforcement or over-
deterrence. However, if scholars are correct that antitrust faces the opposite problem, 
there are institutional design foundations for a default to breakups.  
More ex post breakups can improve ex ante identification of harmful mergers. 
Since firms proposing a merger have far more extensive information than do antitrust 
authorities, they are in a better position to predict whether a given merger will later 
prove anticompetitive. By pursuing the remedy that firms dislike the most, ex post 
breakups can cause firms to internalize the costs of anticompetitive mergers. Holding 
enforcers’ merger approval process constant,329 an increase in ex post breakups would 
therefore overall add more of the private sector’s sophistication to determining which 
mergers should not move forward due to anticompetitive concerns.330 The potential to 
better calibrate antitrust diagnostics support a breakup default. 
Institutional design considerations also apply to the administration of the remedy. 
Even with a flawless design, access mandates usually require ongoing oversight. 
Consequently, executives can retain their monopoly power if they can sufficiently 
outmaneuver regulatory monitoring. More broadly, there are many different ways to 
abuse monopoly power. As a result, beyond policing a firm for a specific behavioral 
remedy, the government must have mechanisms for policing that same firm for 
different violations.  
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A breakup that addresses monopoly power, rather than leaving it intact, offers the 
greatest potential to save both of those ongoing sources of regulatory oversight. The 
private sector has greater resources and sophistication than antitrust authorities, whose 
budgets have not grown or have shrunk even as the markets they regulate expanded 
considerably.331 Access remedies requiring enduring government involvement are 
therefore more in tension with agencies’ resource and sophistication limitations than 
are breakups, which offer a clear end point.332 
Another institutional limitation on antitrust authorities is that their leadership is 
subject to sudden changes in the political process when new presidential 
administrations arrive. Consequently, a monopoly subject to behavioral constraints 
could wait for a more deregulatory political regime to assume control of antitrust 
enforcement, at which point the monopolist could petition for lax monitoring or 
removal of the restraints.333 Relatedly, the monopoly’s efforts to capture enforcers are 
more constant than public attention. That asymmetry in pressure and the subtle nature 
of regulatory monitoring make access mandates vulnerable to erosion.  
Breakups are inherently more resistant to the political process.334 Granted, the 
changing of presidential administrations complicated the government’s decision not to 
continue pursuing a breakup of Microsoft following the appeal.335 Still, once a breakup 
is achieved it is comparatively more difficult for a future pro-monopoly FTC, for 
instance, to reconstruct the prior monopoly. Thus, breakups may be more likely to 
succeed because they require less monitoring by both the enforcer and the public.  
Finally, breakups are the more market-oriented remedy. Those arguing for 
inaction or the continuation of more cautious antitrust enforcement often reason that 
dynamic competition will ultimately unseat even monopolies.336 That view weighs in 
favor of conduct over structural remedies, because markets have the chance to respond 
to inevitable imperfections in the breakup administration. In contrast, with access 
remedies, private actors face a sustained non-market constraint. Those putting faith in 
markets, and dynamic competition, should thus find that mandated breakups driven by 
the private sector are the more appealing antitrust remedy. 
The case for a breakup default is strongest in the case of consummated mergers. 
It may thus be worth shifting the burden of proof onto the party arguing against 
breakups in the post-merger context. Moreover, as Steven Salop has argued, antitrust 
authorities should consider requiring divestitures of the company even if the divested 
pieces are unrelated to the original anticompetitive merger.337 That principle is crucial 
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in the context of a monopoly’s acquisition of a nascent competitor, which may have 
halted the competitor during the sole window of time comprising any true threat.338  
Should breakups be the default remedy beyond the post-merger context? Although 
a universal antitrust breakup default for non-merger cases is unwarranted, the 
traditional deference to enforcers’ choice of remedy seems sensible—even if the 
remedy is a breakup. In choosing a remedy, however, enforcers should consider the 
factors mentioned above—the challenges of policing monopolies for behavioral 
remedies, need for deterrence, and broader economic benefits of breakups. Enforcers 
and judges should then make the final decision based on what would most help 
consumers and society rather than which remedy fits the wrong most closely.  
 
2. Comparing Breakups to Inaction and Other Alternatives 
 
Space constraints do not allow for devoting similar attention to comparing other 
alternatives, but a few brief notes are in order. Other alternatives include financial 
penalties, regulation outside of antitrust, and inaction. Financial penalties are difficult 
and impractical to set at a deterrent level.339 These and other alternatives are worthy of 
sustained examination, and in some contexts one or several of them combined may be 
superior to breakups. However, overall, conduct prohibitions and penalties are less 
promising than other options for returning the full costs of the anticompetitive merger 
back to society moving forward.  
In terms of regulatory interventions outside of antitrust, new legal rules would be 
needed for many such proposals for oversight, such as treating online platforms as 
utilities.340 Thus, those outside-of-antitrust alternatives may not be practical—making 
the real choice between an antitrust remedy and no intervention. 
If breakups cannot be used once a company has integrated, for some the best 
option would be inaction. There is little doubt that preventing anticompetitive mergers 
beforehand is better than prosecuting them afterwards. Moreover, , the lowest-cost 
intervention—narrowly defined as the expenditures by government—will always be to 
do nothing and hope that markets will dislodge the monopoly, such as through 
disruptive innovation.341 And it is hard to argue with the proposition that, all else equal, 
antitrust should promote competition through the intervention with the least 
administrative costs.  
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However, it is difficult to identify all anticompetitive mergers in advance.342 
Additionally, if the goal is to address monopoly power, we cannot be assured that an 
organic market disruption is around the corner. An extreme faith in markets to solve 
all problems has become far less common than it was during formative years in antitrust 
development.343 Since then, Nobel-prize winning work in transaction costs, behavioral 
economics, and information asymmetries has laid the foundations showing that market 
failures are widespread and persistent.344  
Moreover, the economic goal is not to lower the expenses incurred by the 
government and the monopoly in implementing the remedy. Instead, it is to advance 
competitive markets that improve consumer welfare—measured, in great part, by 
efficiency.345 To be sure, an efficiency analysis should include the remedy 
implementation expenses. But there is no strong evidence that antitrust breakups harm 
efficiency.346 Therefore, the remedy that costs the least to implement—inaction—can 
be by far the economically most harmful choice if it leaves in place a monopolist that 
substantially lowers consumer welfare—or provides incentives for anticompetitive 
mergers.  
A default to breakups would leave open the possibility of convincing evidence 
swaying the remedy choice in another direction, including inaction. If a startup is 
gaining rapid market share with a game-changing technology, for instance, inaction 
may be preferable. Absent such compelling evidence to the contrary, however, when 
deciding between breakups and inaction, there is strong support for defaulting to 
pursuing a breakup remedy.  
In summary, the design of remedies should reflect antitrust law’s institutional and 
political constraints. When the cost-benefit analysis yields a clear preferable remedy in 
any given case, that remedy should be adopted. However, in many cases economic 
analysis will fail to yield any firm conclusion as to the best remedy. In light of the 
existing constraints on antitrust agencies and trials, a purportedly neutral approach may 
produce outcomes counter to what antitrust most needs given the pressures toward 
under-deterrence. Furthermore, a working hypothesis that begins with breakups as the 
preferred remedy, and resolves ambiguity in their favor, would result in more actual 
breakups. It would thus produce the data points needed to reassess the hypothesis and 
readjust in accordance with up-to-date, sophisticated empirics rather than outdated 
studies, historical anecdotes, and intuition. As a practical matter, a breakup default may 
be necessary to right the course toward eventually choosing breakups on the merits.  
 
C.  Expanding Breakups 
 
 
342 See Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Merger Analysis and the Treatment of 
Uncertainty: Should We Expect Better?, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 537, 538 (2007) (noting error risks).  
343 See Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 64, at 11 (citing the decline of Schumpeterian influence). 
344 The recipients include Ronald Coase (1991) and Douglas North (1993) for transaction costs; 
George Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph E. Stiglitz (2001) for information asymmetries; and 
Daniel Kahneman (2002) and Richard Thaler (2017) for behavioral economics. All Prizes in 
Economic Sciences, NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/uncategorized/all-prizes-in-
economic-sciences/ [https://perma.cc/9SZ4-BQNT]. 
345 See, e.g., Shelanski & Sidak, supra note 64, at 19 (discussing allocative efficiency). 
346 See supra Part II. 
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Greater clarity about administering breakups speaks to perhaps the most 
controversial antitrust entity: the monopoly that did not obtain its dominance through 
mergers and has done nothing illegal. As a matter of law, “monopolists are permitted 
to keep their lawfully acquired market positions so long as they do not engage in 
exclusionary practices.”347 Those firms can charge monopoly prices. 
This Article does not establish that society would be better off by getting rid of 
the conduct requirement and making even monopolies obtained by “superior skill, 
foresight and industry”348 illegal. However, in two main ways a more comprehensive 
understanding of breakups weakens the existing antitrust allowance of such 
“successful” monopolies. First, the leading justification for allowing monopolies to 
exist and charge monopoly prices is to provide incentives for innovation and 
investment.349 Most famously, Justice Scalia explained: 
 
The mere possession of monopoly power, and the 
concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is not only not 
unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market 
system. The opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least 
for a short period— is what attracts “business acumen” in the 
first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation 
and economic growth. To safeguard the incentive to 
innovate, the possession of monopoly power will not be 
found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of 
anticompetitive conduct.350 
 
DOJ officials have echoed those concerns by citing as the leading, if not the only, 
obstacle the need “to protect the very incentives to innovate.”351 In particular, the 
articulated fear is discouraging entrepreneurs from starting up a company.352  
In other words, innovation is the principal reason given not to break up a firm that 
is charging monopoly prices. Absent that concern, society would be better off ending 
the consumer welfare harms from monopoly pricing. The innovation argument in favor 
of monopolies is powerful because many see innovation as the most important driver 
of economic growth and progress.353  
The protection of innovation is valuable. In light of what breakups can accomplish 
as a remedy, however, innovation concerns do not support the current antitrust 
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348 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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2008, at 203 (“U.S. antitrust laws recognize . . . . monopoly profits as the desirable rewards for 
entrepreneurship.”). 
350 Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004).  
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permissiveness of success-driven monopolies. To assess that concern, it bears emphasis 
that breaking up an organic monopoly would only happen when a company becomes 
extremely successful. That constraint means that the breakup could unfold in a way 
that would offer those who built the company sufficient rewards for their innovation.  
To illustrate, consider how the innovation source of resistance to breakups would 
play out in the leading targets for breakups, Google, Facebook, and Amazon. If 
Amazon were split between into several companies—say its cloud computing business, 
its Amazon-owned sales business, and a platform—founder and CEO Jeff Bezos would 
still own stakes in enormous companies and still be among the wealthiest humans ever 
to exist, like Rockefeller was after the government carved up Standard Oil.354 It is hard 
to imagine future entrepreneurs would look to Bezos at that point and somehow be 
discouraged from following similar paths.  
As further perspective, consider a hypothetical in which Amazon, Google, and 
Facebook were by some antitrust administrative mistake shut down today. In such a 
scenario, those companies’ founders would still be extraordinarily wealthy. It is not 
clear that even under those circumstances entrepreneurs would be discouraged from a 
path whose worst-case antitrust scenario was extremely unlikely and would still leave 
them so well off and famous. Moreover, if such outcomes occurred by mistake, reforms 
could be implemented to halt or change the breakup process. To be clear, this Article 
does not propose such a scenario, which would be riskier from the perspective of 
innovation incentives and would harm consumer welfare. Still, the hypothetical is 
informative because it shows the limited downsides as measured by the innovation 
argument’s main concern.  
Moreover, the sale of the company’s assets can be assessed before completing the 
forced deal. If the proposed sale would leave the monopoly’s founders and investors 
uncompensated to a degree that might discourage future innovation, the government 
could change course. That approach would address scholarly concerns about making 
investments in research and development unprofitable. The current policy of blanket 
prohibitions even of breakups that would leave innovators amply compensated—a 
policy justified by concerns about those innovators—is inconsistent with the 
prevalence of profitable private divestitures that leave shareholders better off.355 
Additionally, a defining feature of entrepreneurship is “high risk.”356 The vast 
majority of startups fail to yield significant returns on investment.357 If by error, 
occasionally antitrust enforcement erased the wealth of an innovator who created a 
monopoly, it would be counterintuitive if such rare occurrences would discourage a 
group of people who are already undeterred by long odds. Of course, if breakups 
routinely wiped out the wealth of entrepreneurs, that would risk changing incentives. 
Again, though, the historical record does not indicate that breakups impoverish 
entrepreneurs.  
Despite the existing policy’s questionable foundations, the valid concerns about 
harming innovation should still inform the design of any no-fault monopolization 
 
354 See supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
355 See supra Part III.A. 
356 See D. Daniel Sokol, Antitrust’s “Curse of Bigness” Problem, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1259, 1275 
(2020). 
357 William R. Kerr et al., Entrepreneurship as Experimentation, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 2014, 
at 26. 
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standard.358 As mentioned above, when the remedy responds to a consummated merger 
or other illegal conduct, a breakup may need to be accompanied by disgorgement or 
penalties to sufficiently deter. However, when breakups are used against monopoly 
power obtained legally—by offering a better product—such a penalty need not be part 
of the remedy. The goal would be to remove or lower the ability to exercise monopoly 
power. By allowing the entrepreneur in such situations to split up the successful 
monopoly and reap the rewards of the market price of that sale, antitrust law can 
address the harms from monopolies and the concerns about discouraging monopolies 
built on successful products.  
The innovation discussion in this section has so far focused on incentives to 
innovate up to the point of becoming a monopoly because that is the chief justification 
for the current antitrust regime. A related issue is worth considering briefly, albeit of 
secondary importance: What would be the effects on innovation moving forward of 
breaking up a monopoly? Antitrust scholars are divided on how such an intervention 
would affect innovation,359 but those debates omit the private sector perspective on 
breakups. Many large firms have broken themselves up to become more innovative.360 
There is reason to believe monopolies would be unlikely to pursue such innovation-
improving divestitures if the effect would be to lessen their monopoly rents.  
Thus, although it is beyond the scope here to settle the broader debate about 
innovation and antitrust, the most prominent normative foundation for allowing 
monopolies is in tension with a business sector view of breakups and innovation. It is 
inaccurate to state that we must tolerate monopoly prices because doing so is vital to 
motivating innovation. A more refined understanding of breakups shows that antitrust 
law can have it both ways by breaking up some currently lawful monopolies.  
Moving beyond innovation, the rehabilitation of breakups informs debates about 
reforming antitrust law’s treatment of successful monopolies. The law’s 
permissiveness of monopolies is easier to defend from a paradigm of breakups being 
unwieldy. If breakups are viewed as disastrous or radical, there may be no viable 
remedy for a company that acquired and maintained its monopoly power legally. 
Behavioral remedies could work in some situations, but there would be no wrongful 
conduct to fix for an otherwise law-abiding firm.  
Moreover, to preserve innovation incentives an organic monopoly would 
presumably need to be compensated by competitors for providing access. That would 
require the government to oversee the pricing of that access over time. Even more 
problematic would be situations in which access and traditional behavioral remedies 
would not fit. In those cases, the only remedy that would address monopoly prices may 
be price control, or the government setting the price of the monopoly’s products at 
something reflecting the competitive level. Yet price controls are economically 
disfavored.361  
 
358 On the importance of innovation informing antitrust remedies, see Keith N. Hylton, A Unified 
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In other words, one of the potential obstacles to reforming antitrust law to 
prosecute more monopolies is the uncertainty how to intervene. An informed view of 
breakups provides a workable and promising remedy. There would need to be other 
reasons to want to allow the law to continue permitting monopolies, rather than due to 
the absence of a feasible remedy.  
It bears emphasis that there is room for large businesses and some concentrated 
markets that bring more benefit to consumers and society than alternatives. The 
question of when a broken-up industry would improve consumer welfare is not the 
focus of this Article. But some companies, such as social networks, can only be broken 
up so far in the traditional sense without ruining what is valuable to consumers.362   
The costs of a breakup are real and appropriate to consider in choosing the remedy. 
And courts should retain skepticism when it is not the government seeking the breakup, 
but a competitor suing its rival. A more expansive vision for breakups may be in order, 
but that does not mean the government should go on a rampage to make all industries 
fragmented.  
Rather, the main point is that some of the key foundations for the current near-
universal allowance of organic monopolies erodes when viewed in the context of what 
is known about governance and divestitures outside of antitrust. There are other non-
economic reasons some may oppose or support antitrust breakups of organic 
monopolies.363 But the leading economic foundations for allowing monopolies—
providing motivation to innovate—are conjectural. Those foundations also sit in 
tension with widespread business practices, history, and a common sense consideration 
of the example set by wealthy founders of broken up companies.  
In contrast, there are well-established consumer welfare harms from a firm 
charging monopoly prices.364 Thus, the main economic argument cited by Supreme 
Court justices, scholars, and antitrust authorities does not hold as the foundation for a 
universal rule that monopolies should not be broken up.  
A more accurate understanding of administrability illuminates not only the flaws 
in the current regime, but also the path forward. It is possible to construct an antitrust 
policy that reflects both that valid emphasis on innovation and the economic value of 
limiting monopoly power. Legislative reforms would, for companies who obtained and 
maintained excess monopoly power lawfully, seek to break up those companies when 
possible to do so in a way that both preserves the core appeal to consumers and rewards 
the entrepreneurs for their innovation. Like in other areas of antitrust, judicial review 
would provide a check on abuse of such power.  
Note that this proposal channels the leading scholarly justification of the status 
quo—innovation incentives—into designing a better approach to administering 
breakups. The framework is likewise consistent with Justice Scalia’s emphasis on 
allowing monopoly profits “at least for a short period,” since—unlike in the case of 
monopolies obtained or maintained by unlawful conduct—the breakup of lawful 
monopolies would not involve disgorgement of those prior monopoly profits.  
 
362 For a thoughtful challenge to no-fault monopolization, see Marina Lao, No-Fault Digital 
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In summary, without breakups, there will sometimes be nothing that antitrust can 
do to advance competition. Greater openness to breakups should be pursued because 
they address the clear harm of monopolies instead of emphasizing unproven risks of 
disastrous breakups or stifled innovation. Removing breakups’ administrative 
misperceptions will recharge the law’s power to combat monopolies, and make the 
field less vulnerable to accusations of “irrelevance.”365 When breakups would benefit 
society, lawmakers and enforcers should not hesitate to use them—even in the face of 
monopolies previously thought untouchable. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The field of antitrust would benefit from a more interdisciplinary examination of 
breakups, drawing on both administrative law scholarship and business scholarship. 
An outside-of-antitrust lens, along with a closer look at the existing case against 
breakups, reveals that the widespread, deeply ingrained antitrust hostility to breakups 
is unfounded. There is insufficient evidence that government-mandated breakups have 
harmed the economy. Moreover, business executives and shareholders regularly 
initiate breakups as part of good corporate governance. Owners overall emerge from 
those events wealthier than before, despite substantial costs, delays, and organizational 
upheaval. Antitrust authorities are being held to a standard of success that would 
cripple private sector mergers and acquisitions. Unless evidence emerges suggesting 
that such interventions are harmful, enforcers and courts should more liberally pursue 
breakups, and legislators should consider expanding the remedy’s reach to currently 
legal monopolies.  
Indeed, it is quite possible that even the breakup of companies incorrectly targeted 
could yield benefits to the economy and to the company. CEOs often pursue 
counterproductive empire building, thus producing more unmanageable companies 
that are unable to adapt with modern fast-changing markets. Many antitrust breakups 
would also yield non-antitrust efficiency and innovation gains currently omitted from 
the antitrust analysis. Although indiscriminate breakups would be counterproductive, 
these obscured gains show that the risks of incorrect identification are not as grave as 
characterized.  
Most importantly, the potential upside for competition, and society, is substantial. 
Perhaps a better analogy for antitrust than unscrambling eggs is that controlled burns 
help reinvigorate forests, allowing ecosystems to regenerate and emerge more resilient 
than before.  The working hypothesis moving forward should be that more breakups 
would have a similar effect on markets: they have short-term costs in the service of 
preserving market health and competition in the long term. The only way to test that 
hypothesis is to begin exercising the authority that has long existed and that lawmakers 
and antitrust authorities have become irrationally reluctant to use. Doing so may not 
only end the mismanagement of the ultimate antitrust remedy, but also free the field 
from any enforcement paralysis. 
 
* * * 
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